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Accumulating evidence on indoor radon gas pollution of homes in the United
States indicates that it may be the source of tremendous health problems. These
problems include various types of cancer caused by exposure to the radioactive gas.
The harm and potential harm resulting from this toxic exposure has not yet been
addressed by the courts.
In this Article Professors Cross and Murray examine the scope of the radon
problem and survey the common law for remedies and defenses available in a tort
action brought on the grounds of radon contamination.
Because of the exposure already inflicted on our families, the pain we
feel will never subside. My own home... has a radon level 100 times
higher than the safe recommended guideline. Our homes are 7 times
higher than the level at which a uranium mine must be shut down....
My four small children.., have been exposed to [the equivalent of] 22
packs of cigarettes a day ... for eight years now.
No one can fully understand the guilt and anguish that we have
had to bear .... 1
Radon (also known as "Rn") is an odorless radioactive gas commonly
found in the atmosphere throughout the world. In the United States radon
tends to be concentrated within buildings, such as homes. 2 Like other forms of
radioactivity, radon can induce cancer. Indoor radon levels currently are caus-
ing as many as 20,000 lung cancer deaths every year in this country.3 Although
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1. See Hearings On Radon and Indoor Air Pollution Before the Subcomm. On Natural Re-
sources, Agriculture Research and Environment of the House CommL on Science and Technology, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1985) [hereinafter Radon Hearings].
2. A report of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognized the danger:
Radon is a radioactive gas produced by the radioactive decay of radium-226, which occurs
naturally in almost all soils and rocks. Radon is present in the atmosphere everywhere due
to its release from radium decaying in the ground. Outdoor radon levels generally are low.
Typical indoor levels are usually about five times higher than average outdoor levels, but
can be over ten thousand times higher.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT To CONGRESS ON INDOOR AIR POLLU-
TION AND RADON UNDER TITLE IV, SUPERPUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF
1986 12 (April 1987) [hereinafter EPA RADON REPORT].
3. See Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at I (statement of Rep. James H. Scheuer of New York).
While 20,000 is the EPA's upper estimate, some have suggested that as many as 30,000 deaths may
be caused each year by radon. See Galen, Lawyers Grapple With Radon Issue, Nat'l L.J., July 21,
1986, at 1, col. 1. Even critics of these high estimates acknowledge that radon is responsible for
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this problem has received relatively little publicity, the dimensions of indoor
radon exposure may dwarf those of every other environmental pollution prob-
lem in the United States.4 The overall radiation exposure from indoor radon is
far in excess of that from nuclear power plants,5 and one author has suggested
that the existing indoor "radon levels are the radiation equivalent of having a
Three Mile Island accident . . . occur in the neighborhood every week."
'6
Notwithstanding this magnitude of harm, there is very little government regula-
tion of the indoor radon pollution problem. 7 Consequently, individuals subject
to hazardous levels of indoor radon in their homes must turn to the common law
for remedies.
Indeed, homeowners increasingly are turning to litigation to remedy their
perceived indoor radon problems. While a growing number of cases are being
filed, 8 however, most of the legal issues involved in radon-based actions remain
unresolved. The two existing reported decisions failed to reach most of the criti-
cal liability questions. 9 As a consequence, courts now are confronted with a new
10,000 deaths annually. Eckholm, Radon: Threat Is Real, But Scientists Argue Over Its Severity,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1986, at CI, col. 1. Other studies, suggesting between 1,000 and 20,000 deaths,
are summarized by the American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs. See Radon in
Homes, 258 J. A.M.A. 668, 670 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Hanley, Radon: For the Homeowner, Some Questions and Answers, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 1, 1987, at 39, col. 3. ("Federal and scientific experts agree that radon is a greater risk than
more widely publicized threats like asbestos, toxic waste dumps and dioxin"); Radon Detectors,
CONSUMER REP., July 1987, at 440, 442 ("[Tlhere is no doubt that the risks of radon vastly exceed
the risks from aflatoxin, PCBs, nuclear wastes, and virtually all other environmental hazards").
Indeed, the indoor hazard from radon may exceed the risk from all outdoor pollutants combined.
See also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING CAN-
CER RISKS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT 91 (1981) ("Doll and Peto estimated that 2% of cancer mor-
tality, representing approximately 8,000 cancer deaths, can be attributed to industrial pollution of
air, water and food .... ).
5. Galen, Health Dangers that "Put Everything Else to Shame," Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1986, at 8
(quoting Bernard Cohen, a physics professor at the University of Pittsburgh, as stating that "radia-
tion from nuclear power, radioactive wastes and nuclear accidents is just one thousandth the prob-
lem of indoor radon").
6. Nero, The Indoor Radon Story, TECH. REV., Jan. 1986, at 28, 28.
7. EPA disclaims authority to regulate indoor radon pollution. See Galen, supra note 3, at 8
(citing Richard Guimond, director of EPA's Radon Action Program). See generally GENERAL
ACCT. OFF., INDOOR AIR POLLUTION: AN EMERGING HEALTH PROBLEM 11-18 (1980) (describing
ineffectiveness of federal government efforts to respond to indoor air quality); Kirsch, Behind Closed
Doors: IndoorAir Pollution and Government Policy, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (1982) (discussing
indoor pollutants, reviewing applicable federal legislation, and proposing legislative reform). Con-
gress has recently taken small preliminary steps to address the problem, by enacting the Radon Gas
and Indoor Air Quality Research Act of 1986, in conjunction with the Superfund Amendments.
This new law provides only for research, however, and contains no regulatory authority. See Radon
Gas & Indoor Air Quality Research Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 401-05, 100 Stat. 1613,
1758-60 (1986). Moreover, "the Reagan Administration has consistently dragged its feet on meeting
the EPA's budget requests for radon projects." Radon Detectors, supra note 4, at 442. See also
Galen, supra note 3, at 10, col. 2 (referring to the "government's sluggishness" in addressing indoor
radon problems); GAO Says EPA Best Suited To Lead Effort To Control "National Problem" of
Radon Gas, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 407 (July 11, 1986) ("No coordinated federal agency
strategy exists for indoor radon control.").
8. See Galen, supra note 3, at 8, col. 3 ("litigation concerning naturally occurring radon is
steadily on the upswing"); Comment, Radon Gas: Ramifications for Real Estate Transactions in
Pennsylvania, 91 DICK. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1987) ("suits have been filed against contractors, and
more suits can be expected").
9. In the first decision, Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985), plaintiffs were wholly unsuccessful. In 1968, the Waynes began con-
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and vexing "toxic tort" situation. This Article attempts to provide guidance for
the resolution of liability and damage questions surrounding excessive indoor
radon exposures.
Part I of the Article10 addresses the scope and sources of the indoor radon
exposure problem. This section considers the source of the hazard, how resi-
dences may contribute to high exposure levels, the pattern of current exposure
levels, and the risk presented from such current levels. Through such analysis,
the degree of danger posed within an individual home may be determined. Part
I also reviews available remedial measures for houses with radon problems and
summarizes the efficacy and the cost of the various suggested approaches.
Part II of the Article1 1 explores the potential liability attendant to excessive
indoor radon concentrations. There are no established precedents permitting
homeowners to recover for these exposures. Nevertheless, several theories of lia-
bility, including strict liability, implied warranty of habitability, negligence, and
fraud are readily adaptable to the instant controversy. The promise of any given
approach will necessarily depend on the facts of a given situation, but at least
one of several common law theories should be available to most homeowners
who are exposed to particularly high concentrations of radon in their residences.
Part 11112 discusses the types of damages available to successful plaintiffs.
Although radon may expose persons to a greatly increased risk of future cancer,
often it will be difficult to recover for this threat, except in exceptional cases.
Plaintiffs have a better prospect of recovering for mental anguish suffered from
the exposure and for the cost of future needed medical surveillance. In addition,
homeowners should be able to recover some lost property damages or repair
costs to correct the radon hazard in their homes. On occasion, such a plaintiff
could even rescind the contract by which she purchased the home. Before ad-
dressing these legal implications, however, we begin by analyzing the indoor
radon problem itself.
struction of their home in Tennessee. During construction, the Waynes purchased concrete blocks
filled with phosphate slag, which were used in the construction of their basement. In 1969, the
Waynes and their two children moved into the home and lived there until 1979, when they learned
that the phosphate slag was emitting potentially harmful radiation. Id. at 394. In September 1979,
the Waynes moved out of their home, on the advice of the Tennessee Public Health Department and
EPA. Id. at 395. The Waynes sued Tennessee Valley Authority in 1981, alleging breach of implied
warranty, negligence, and strict liability. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi dismissed all these claims, however, as time-barred under the Tennessee statute of
limitations for product liability actions. Id. at 395, 399-402 (affirming district court). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also affirmed dismissal on a separate cause of action for
fraudulent concealment, holding that the TVA neither knew nor reasonably could have known of the
radon hazard as early as 1969. Id. at 395-396.
A second case, Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984), was somewhat
more successful. The reported decision permitted the plaintiffs to sue for future cancer risk, based
on the probability that they already had suffered subcellular harm from radon exposure. Id. at 17,
18. Subsequently, plaintiffs settled for an undisclosed amount of money. Galen, supra note 3, at 10
(permitted settlement based on increased risk of developing cancer).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 13-107.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 108-256.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 257-365.
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I. THE CAUSES, NATURE, AND EXTENT OF THE RADON HAZARD IN
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS
To date, discussion of the radon problem has centered on generalized na-
tional statistics. More focus is required to determine the availability of legal
remedies for individual instances of radon exposure. This section provides back-
ground on the nature of the carcinogenic hazard presented by radon, the degree
of that hazard presented by individual residences, and the various potential
sources of that hazard. This type of analysis is necessary for an individual
homeowner to assess her risks and appropriate courses of action.
A. The Nature of the Radon Hazard
Uranium is a well-known element, commonly found throughout the earth's
crust, which breaks down or "decays" 13 first into Radium-226, which in turn
forms Radon-222. 14 Radon-222 ultimately breaks down into its own radioactive
progeny or "daughters." 15 The alpha and beta particles emitted by these ele-
ments, like all radioactive substances, damage exposed human tissue and may
cause cancer to develop in such tissues. 16 Radon exposure from outside sources
is a risk common to all humanity, but is largely vitiated by natural dispersal of
the harmful particles. In cases of inside radon exposure, the threat to individu-
als results from the entrapment and buildup of harmful particles within a struc-
ture. It is this buildup, which may result from several circumstances, that may
damage humans.
Before assigning liability for radon damage, it is essential to identify the
source of the harmful exposure. Although all radon exposure ultimately traces
back to the earth, indoor radon may derive from three distinct sources:
(i) building materials permeated with radioactive materials; (ii) radiation-con-
taining water or natural gas used in the home; and (iii) the ground underlying
the home itself. In individual instances, any one or more of these sources may
create an indoor radon hazard.
13. All radioactive elements "decay" by releasing subatomic particles, thus transforming them
into other somewhat more stable elements. For a readily comprehensible summary of this process,
see the discussion in Kirsch, supra note 7, at 343 & nn. 29-30.
14. Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 118. Sheldon Meyers, Acting Director of The Office of
Radiation Programs in the EPA, has stated:
Radon is a radioactive gas formed by decay of radium which is formed in turn by the decay
of uranium that is naturally present in rocks and soil in many parts of the United States.
Since radium and uranium are common elements in rock and soil, radon is being con-
stantly generated everywhere.
Id. at 117. See generally COMM. ON INDOOR POLLUTANTS, BOARD ON TOxICOLOGY & ENVTL.
HEALTH HAZARDS, ASSEMBLY OF LIFE SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INDOOR POL-
LUTANTS 58-62 (1981) [hereinafter NRC] (summarizing natural background sources of radiation
and the production of radon); Radon in Homes, supra note 3, at 668.
15. The radon daughters are known as lead-214, bismuth-214, polonium-210, and polonium-
214. See N. NAGDA, H. RECTOR & M. KOONTZ, GUIDELINES FOR MONITORING INDOOR AIR
QUALITY 10 (1987) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. Polonium-210 and polonium-214, combined with
radon, present the greatest threat to human health. See R. WADDEN & P. SCHEFF, INDOOR AIR
POLLUTION: CHARACTERIZATION, PREDICTION AND CONTROL 32 (1983). For a judicial summary
of this process, see Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 385-87 (D. Kan. 1984).
16. See I. TURIEL, INDOOR AIR QUALITY AND HUMAN HEALTH 37-38 (1985).
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Building materials were first implicated as a significant source of indoor
radon exposure in Europe.17 Concrete blocks or bricks used in construction are
the most likely sources of radium in building materials.18 While ordinary con-
crete may not present a substantial radon hazard, materials produced from in-
dustrial residues occasionally may have highly elevated levels of uranium or
radium.19 Notwithstanding these exceptional instances, however, experts now
believe that "concrete could account for only up to [ten] percent" of indoor
radon concentrations.20 Studies on the contribution of concrete and other build-
ing materials to indoor radon generally concur that these products are not a
primary source.21 Although individual episodes of high radon from building
materials may exist, this source is not responsible for the majority of indoor
radon exposure.
22
Water and natural gas also may contribute to indoor radon levels. Ground-
water or gas in certain parts of the United States may contain high levels of
radiation, 23 and human exposure may result during showers or at other times
when these utilities are exposed to the air.24 Water and natural gas are not the
largest sources of indoor radon, and contribute perhaps no more than three per-
cent of the average concentration found throughout the country.25 In some in-
stances, however, water may be a major contributor to high indoor radon
exposures.
26
17. For a summary of the European experience with building materials, see NRC, supra note
14, at 63; Nero, Airborne Radionuclides and Radiation in Buildings" A Review, 45 HEALTH PHYSICS
303, 306-07 (1983).
18. See Nero, supra note 17, at 307; Nero, supra note 6, at 37.
19. See NRC, supra note 14, at 63 (noting particularly that concrete blocks containing
phosphate slag derived from phosphate production in the southeastern United States may contain
uniquely high levels of radioactive substances).
20. Nero, supra note 6, at 37.
21. See Ingersoll, A Survey of Radionuclide Contents and Radon Emanation Rates in Building
Materials Used in the U.S., 45 HEALTH PHYSICS 363, 367-68 (1983); Kahn, Eichholz & Clarke,
Search for Building Materials as Sources of Elevated Radiation Dose, 45 HEALTH PHYSICS 349, 359
(1983). The Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association observed that
"[building materials are believed to contribute only small amounts of radon, unless tailings from
uranium or phosphate mining operations have been used in construction." Radon in Homes, supra
note 3, at 669.
22. See Nero, Indoor Concentrations of Radon-222 and Its Daughters: Sources, Range and En-
vironmental Influences, in INDOOR AIR AND HUMAN HEALTH, 43, 49 (1985) ("It is clear that
materials utilized in a building structure can contribute to substantial indoor concentrations,
although this is not usually the case ....").
23. See, eg., NRC, supra note 14, at 69. This appears to be a particular problem with well
water in the state of Maine, where "[h]igh levels of indoor radon have been found ... partly because
of the large amounts of the gas in domestic water supplies." Nero, supra note 6, at 31.
24. See Brennan & Turner, Defeating Radon, SOLAR AGE, Mar. 1986, at 33.
25. Nero, supra note 22, at 50; see also E.P.A., Water Pollution Control: Natural Primary
Drinking Water Regulations; Radionuclides, 51 Fed. Reg. 34836, 34842 (1986) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 141) (proposed Sept. 30, 1986) ("2% to 5% is the drinking water contribution to average
exposure for indoor radon levels").
26. Nero, supra note 22, at 50. Nero observes that "the very high water-borne concentrations
that are sometimes found will contribute much larger airborne concentrations." He goes on to note
that a substantial minority of homes in the United States ("about 1% of the entire housing stock")
may have considerable waterborne exposure to radon. Id. at 51. On balance, water is "[p]robably
more important than building materials, as a source of radon in certain parts of the housing stock."
Id. at 50; see also Radon in Homes, supra note 3, at 669-70 (radon levels in water highest when water
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By far the largest source of indoor radon appears to be radioactive elements
in the ground beneath affected residences. There is now a virtual consensus that
ground emissions are the largest source of indoor radon exposure levels.27
Moreover, most of these radon emissions from the soil are purely natural and
not related to human activity. 28 Although radium concentrations in the ground
vary, virtually all soils emit some radon gas.29 This gas may then diffuse into an
overlying structure, through various pathways, and cause the structure to be
contaminated.
Because the ground itself is such a paramount source of radon exposure,
one might conclude that avoidance of high radon soil would solve the indoor air
pollution problem. Certain geographic regions have been identified as being es-
pecially high in radon production. 30 The largest concentration of radon con-
taminated houses is on the East Coast-Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey,
parts of New England, Florida, and the Appalachian Mountains.3 t Unfortu-
nately, "radon problems aren't confined to such areas" and "[t]here is enough
naturally occurring uranium and radium in many soils and bedrocks" to pro-
duce hazardous exposure levels.3 2 The risk of high indoor radon levels appears
to be a nationwide phenomenon. 33 Moreover, the radium levels in the ground
cannot explain the demonstrated higher concentrations found indoors. 34 It is
known that radon levels may vary widely even among houses built in the same
supplied privately and in Appalachia, New England, and Piedmont; radon in water can account for
up to 35% of the difference between indoor and outdoor radon levels).
27. See, eg., Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 184 (according to Richard Wilson, Professor of
Physics at Harvard, "The real hazards, then, are building on ground with high levels of radon, such
as on a geological fault, and inadequate basement sealing."); I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 35 ("Re-
searchers believe that, in most cases, the soil beneath a house is the major source of radon."); Mage
& Gammage, Evaluation of Changes in Indoor Air Quality Occurring Over the Past Several Decades,
in INDOOR AIR AND HUMAN HEALTH, supra note 22, at 15 ("Modern evidence suggests, however,
that in general it is the radon in soil air that is the major source of indoor radon."); Walsh & Louder,
Radon, in INDOOR AIR QUALITY, 143, 145 (P. Walsh, C. Dudney & E. Copenhaver eds. 1984) ("In
the U.S., the main contributor to the Rn input into structures usually seems to be the underlying
soil.").
28. In some instances, uranium mining or other activities have resulted in elevated surface
radon concentrations. However, "[e]xperts and lawyers agree radiation levels from naturally occur-
ring radon far exceed those from man-made sources .... Galen, supra note 3, at 10, col. 4.
29. See Nero, supra note 17, at 310.
30. See, e.g., GEN. AccT. OFF., supra note 7, at 4; DeBenedictis, Manning the Radon Front In
Pennsylvania, E.P.A. J., Aug. 1986, at 6 (discussing the search for such radon "hot spots").
31. See Galen, supra note 3, at 8, col. 2.
32. Brennan & Turner, supra note 24, at 33; see also Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 271 (EPA
congressional question eliciting response that dangerously elevated radon levels "can occur in almost
any location"). One study found indoor radon levels exceeding the EPA limit in 38 of the 50 states.
See Where Radon is Found, Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1986, at 10 (MAP). In addition, homes in locations
with high outdoor radon may have relatively low indoor levels. See Radon Detectors, supra note 4,
at 440.
33. See Berreby, The Radon Raiders: Turning Perils Into Profits, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1987,
§ 3, at 6, col. 2 (radon's "occurrence is so frequent and so unpredictable that the E.P.A. recommends
that every house in America be tested"); INDOOR POLLUTION L. REP., Aug. 1987, at 3 ("According
to EPA Deputy Administrator James Barnes, 'These findings indicate that radon may be a problem
in virtually every state.' "). The recent EPA RADON REPORT concluded that "[e]levated radon
levels have been found in houses in many states-not only where suspected geological factors or the
presence of uranium deposits suggest that radon might be a problem." EPA RADON REPORT, supra
note 2, at 12.
34. See, e.g., Budiansky, Indoor Air Pollution, 14 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 1023 (indoor levels may
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area. Consequently, there must be something in the building structure itself that
concentrates indoor radon levels and thereby creates a hazardous situation.
B. Housing as a Contributor to Radon Exposure
Even when the source of radon is the soil and not building materials, a
building may elevate indoor radon levels. Indoor exposures can be viewed as a
function of two structural factors: (i) the levels of radon gas that enter the house
and (ii) the degree to which that gas is trapped within the house. Individual
building characteristics have an integral effect on both these factors.
Radon from underlying soil enters a building through the basement, if one
exists, and the floor. Structural characteristics of the house affect the rate at
which such gas may be able to enter:
The actual pathway by which radon enters a building from the
soil appears to vary substantially with building design and construc-
tion practice. In houses with concrete basements that are closed to the
outdoors, radon may enter by diffusion through the basement floor, by
convection within basement walls and by movement through cracks
and designed openings or penetrations in either of these components.
35
In short, "cracks" in the floor, whether intended or incidental, permit radon gas
to enter houses.
36
Not only do structural factors, such as cracks and openings, enable radon
to enter a house, these factors may affirmatively draw radon inside the building.
As described by physics professor Richard Wilson of Harvard, "the major prob-
lem is entry of radon gas into the house from below-the house acts as a funnel,
sometimes at a lower pressure than the ground, sucking gas from below."
37
Thus, pressure differentials among other factors may force underground radon
upwards and into residential structures. 38 When this occurs, the structures are
"actively drawing radon from the ground" at up to ten times the normal diffu-
sion rate.39 Installed equipment ranging from exhaust fans to fireplaces to water
heaters may also contribute to this pressure-driven flow of radon into homes.4°
A second important factor contributing to indoor radon exposure levels is
be 20 times higher than outdoors); Walsh & Louder, supra note 27, at 150 ("It is clear that indoor
Rn concentrations can often be a factor of 10 or more higher than outdoor concentrations.").
35. Nero, supra note 17, at 311. According to the AMA Council on Scientific Affairs,
Although it diffuses slowly, if at all, through a solid, thick concrete foundation, radon
passes easily through cinder blocks; through openings or cracks in a foundation; through
openings where water, sewage, or gas pipes enter a house; and into a crawl space and then
into the living area when the earth is not well covered by a material such as concrete.
Radon in Homes, supra note 3, at 669.
36. See also Moeller & Fujimoto, Cost Evaluation of Control Measures for Indoor Radon Prog-
eny, 46 HEALTH PHYSICS 1181, 1181 (1984) (Radon "can readily gain access to inside the building
through cracks in the walls and floor, or through openings where pipe and electrical connections
enter.").
37. Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 184.
38. See Nero, supra note 22, at 48-49 (describing recent studies on the entry rate of radon into
buildings).
39. Nero, supra note 6, at 37.
40. See Hanley, supra note 4, at 39, col. 1.
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the rate at which radon is trapped and concentrated within a building. Home
energy conservation measures, encouraged by the government in response to the
1973 Arab oil embargo, have been implicated as a major cause of high indoor
radon exposures. By reducing ventilation to cut heating and cooling costs, effi-
cient weatherization traps radon within a house and thereby increases indoor
concentrations. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has concluded
that the Department of Energy's weatherization program could result in 10,000
to 20,000 additional radon-induced cancer deaths every year.4 1
Currently, a controversy exists regarding the degree to which these energy
conservation measures increase indoor radon levels. Some studies have found
little or no correlation between reduced ventilation rate and indoor radon con-
centrations. 42 Others have concluded that "low infiltration, energy-efficient
homes do not, in general, have indoor air quality problems." 43 These studies
suggest that the rate of radon intake is a much more important determinant of
indoor levels than is the rate of escape.
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that, for a given house with a given radon
intake level, reduced ventilation will increase indoor radon concentrations. Ra-
don levels will vary inversely with the ventilation rate.4 4 Thus, a fifty percent
reduction in ventilation will roughly double the indoor radon concentration.4 5
A very recent study has concluded that "[w]eatherization of an existing resi-
dence that decreases infiltration by 25% from 1.0 to 0.75 hr - 1 increases the risk
of fatal lung cancer by 37%."46 Reduced ventilation for energy conservation or
other reasons may not "cause" the presence of indoor radon, but it clearly may
significantly aggravate any preexisting problem.
C. Indoor Radon Levels
Various differing units are employed for measuring the concentration of
radon in air.47 For purposes of uniformity, this Article uses the "WL" (working
41. See I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 40. Another authority notes:
Inhaber and King assume that by 2020 U.S. housing will have an average of 0.6 air changes
per hour, compared with a current average of perhaps 1.0. Statistically, this amount of
house tightening will increase the number of lung cancers by 17,000 per year. Other stud-
ies find numbers in this same range.
Nuclear Power Engineering, POWER ENGINEERING, June 1984, at 18.
42. See Nero, supra note 6, at 37 ("To test this association, our group measured both the radon
concentration and the ventilation rate in the houses we examined. The result was surprising: we
found little or no correlation between the two."); Nero, supra note 22, at 45.
43. I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 87.
44. See Nero, supra note 22, at 45; Radon in Homes, supra note 3, at 670.
45. See Nero, Indoor Radiation Exposures From t'Rn and Its Daughters: A View Of The Issue,
45 HEALTH PHYSIcS 277, 281 (1983).
46. Brambley & Gorfien, Radon and Lung Cancer: Incremental Risks Associated with Residen-
tial Weatherization, 11 ENERGY 589, 599 (1986); see also Kirsch, supra note 7, at 346 ("Radon
concentrations can be two to five times higher in energy-efficient homes than in conventional
homes.")
47. A reader of the literature may find radon concentrations measured in nanocuries per cubic
meter (nCi/m3 ), becquerels per cubic meter (Bq/m'), or picocuries per liter (pCi/L), with the latter
being the most common. For simplicity, all these forms are converted to "WL"s within this Article.
The reader should bear in mind, however, that this conversion depends on equilibrium assumptions
and is not meant to be precise.
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level) unit of measurement, which is employed by the EPA in setting standards
for uranium miners. 48 This tool does not measure radon directly, but has the
benefit of measuring the amount of human exposure to the actual harmful alpha
radiation from both radon and its progeny. 49 Exposure to a WL for approxi-
mately 170 hours yields a cumulative exposure of one "WLM" (working level
month).
50
Two recent surveys of national indoor radon levels have reached strikingly
similar conclusions. A review of the literature by Anthony Nero of the Law-
rence Berkeley Laboratory estimated that national median indoor radon levels
were roughly 0.015 WL.5 1 A national survey, of smaller scale, by Professor
Bernard Cohen of the University of Pittsburgh, likewise found an average con-
centration of 0.015 WL.5 2 The studies also revealed that a substantial minority
of homes, numbering roughly one million, have average radon concentrations of
0.08 WL. 53 Furthermore, higher measurements ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 WL "oc-
cur with startling frequency."'54 Numerous other studies roughly confirm these
results.
5 5
Although these figures may seem small, they may result in considerable
cumulative indoor exposure to radon and its daughters. The average level found
in United States homes yields an annual exposure of 0.2 to 0.3 WLM.56 The
higher levels found in roughly one million homes produce an exposure rate of
48. Assuming certain equilibrium conditions, 1 WL equates to 100 pCi/L of radon. See
Hanchey, Uranium Mill Tailings and Radon, reprinted in Uranium Ore Residues Potential Hazards
and Disposition Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the
House Armed Services Comm., 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 505, 506 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings on Ura-
nium Ore Residues]; see also Brambley & Gorfien, supra note 46, at 594 (employing WL measure).
As discussed therein, the translation is inevitably an imprecise one because of possible variance in the
equilibrium factor. One WL is also roughly equal to 100 nCi/m 3 or 3700 Bq/m 3. See GUIDELINES,
supra note 15, at 10. The EPA, however, assumes different equilibrium conditions, under which one
WL is roughly equivalent to 200 pCi/m 3. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND
U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO RADON: WHAT IT IS
AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 10 (Aug. 1986).
49. See Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1482 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); see also Walsh & Louder, supra note 27, at 148-49 (discussing the derivation of WL from
measured concentrations of radon and progeny).
50. See Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 119 (statement of Sheldon Myers of EPA). When
original sources express radon concentrations in other terms, we have converted them into their WL-
or WLM-equivalent.
51. Nero, Schwehf, Nazaroff & Revzan, Distribution of Airborne Radon-222 Concentrations in
U.S. Homes, 234 SCIENCE 992, 994 (1986). The authors estimated a weighted average of 1.42 to 1.54
pCi/L. Id.
52. Cohen, A National Survey of ..uRn in U.S. Homes and Correlating Factors, 51 HEALTH
PHYSICS 175, 176 (1986). The actual estimate of Dr. Cohen was 1.47 pCi/L. Id.
53. Nero, Schwehr, Nazaroff & Revzan, supra note 51, at 995. Nero concluded that these
homes have indoor radon levels of roughly 8 pCi/L; see also Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 139
(statement of John P. Millhone, Director of the Office of Buildings and Community Systems of the
Office of Conservation and Renewable Energy within the U.S. Department of Energy). Millhone
states that these levels exist in "perhaps 2% of U.S. houses, over one million homes." Id.
54. Nero, supra note 22, at 43. Extremely high levels of radon may be limited to "hot spots"
where the readings are attributable to uranium mining or unique geographical conditions. See
Kirsch, supra note 7, at 344-45 & nn.37-39 (describing varying results in specific regions).
55. Many exposure studies are summarized in Radon in Homes, supra note 3, at 669.
56. Nero, supra note 45, at 278; see also Nero, supra note 6, at 36 (reducing the annual estimate
to 0.25 WLM because 25% of Americans live in apartments where radon exposure is lessened by low
ground contact).
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nearly 2 WLM per year.57 The highest indoor radon levels may produce expo-
sures of more than 10 WLM per year.58 The significance of these exposure
levels, in terms of human health, are discussed in the following section.
D. The Risk from Indoor Radon
Many sources now have broadcast the news that indoor radon exposures
may be responsible for 20,000 deaths annually. 59 In the context of civil liability,
however, this overall death toll is less relevant than the degree of risk faced by a
given individual in a given residence. This section explores these risks and the
ability to identify a specific level that should be deemed "unsafe."
Scientists and government officials generally assume that there is no com-
pletely safe level of radon exposure. Any level of exposure to radiation such as
radon, no matter how low, could possibly cause cancer. 60 Although this no
threshold hypothesis is an unprovable assumption, it is relied on in virtually all
government regulation of carcinogens, 61 and the Supreme Court has approved
its use in regulation. 62 This conclusion, however, does not compel the total
elimination of radon exposure. At very low levels, the amount of risk may be so
small as to be de minimis and below public policy concern.
63
The task, therefore, is to define the minimum radon level that may cause
significant harm to building occupants. Studies of the harms of radon exposure
usually have relied on a significant body of exposure evidence gathered by mea-
suring uranium miners. These miners had higher exposure levels than exposure
levels normally associated with radon. The studies of radon risk have taken iden-
tified risk levels and extrapolated downward to the radon levels found in the
indoor environment.6a While some uncertainties remain in this risk assessment
57. Nero, Schwehr, Nazaroff & Revzan, supra note 51, at 995.
58. Nero, supra note 45, at 278-79.
59. See supra note 3.
60. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2822, 2824 (1987) (Federal Radiation Protection Guidance For Occupa-
tional Exposure) (concluding "there is no completely risk-free level of exposure"); 51 Fed. Reg.
45678, 45681 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 57) (Mine Safety and Health Administration) (1986)
(noting that "it is prudent to assume a non-threshold linear relationship for low cumulative radon
daughter exposures"); see also I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 38 ("It is assumed that there is no
smallest or threshold dose for cancer induction .... Not all researchers agree with this assumption,
but many do ....").
61. See Cross, Beyond Benzene" Establishing Principles for a Significance Threshold on Regu.
latable Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 & nn.9-10 (1986) [hereinafter Beyond Benzene] (summa-
rizing government conclusions that "public health policy requires that we assume no threshold of
effect for carcinogens"); Cross, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: A New Approach to the Control of
Airborne Carcinogens, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 215, 220, 226 (1986). EPA's standard for
indoor radon exposures also adopts this convention. See 45 Fed. Reg. 27370, 27371 (Environmental
Protection Agency 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 192).
62. See Industrial Union Dept. (AFL-CIO) v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 635-36
(1980) (plurality opinion). The assumption also has been approved for use in EPA's outdoor radon
regulations. See American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617, 633 n.13 (10th Cir. 1985).
63. See Industrial Union Dept., 448 U.S. at 653-655. See generally Beyond Benzene, supra note
61 (examining the use of and statutory requirement for a significant risk threshold for the regulation
of carcinogenic substances).
64. For a summary of this risk assessment process, see I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 38-40;
Brambley & Gorfien, supra note 46, at 595-97; Harley & Harley, Risk Assessment for Environmental
Exposures to Radon Daughters, reprinted in Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 194-201.
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process,65 the procedure is regularly employed by expert government agencies
and may even understate the true risks of indoor radon.66 The result of this risk
assessment for radon has produced the conclusion that a cumulative exposure to
one WLM presents a lung cancer lifetime risk of at least one in five thousand.67
From this risk assessment, one can roughly calculate the risk posed by spe-
cific houses. For the approximately one million homes with annual exposures of
around 2 WLM, the individual risk from one year's residence is greater than one
in twenty-five hundred. Most people live in a home for more than a single year,
however, and the lung cancer risk of spending a lifetime in such a home is
roughly one in fifty.68 For the average home (with 0.3 WLM annual radon
exposure) the total lifetime risk is approximately one in three hundred.69 How-
ever small these risks may appear at face value, they vastly exceed the typical
outdoor pollution risk controlled by the federal government. 70 More specifi-
cally, these risks are far greater than that allowed in the government regulations
for radon in drinking water.
7 1
Utilizing the available and acceptable risk estimates, it may be that even the
average house presents an unreasonable hazard to residents. 72 Other sources
may also provide help in determining appropriate minimum safe radon levels.
The table on page 698 lists some of the many available guidelines that might also
be used to define "unsafe" levels of radon exposure. 73 These standards or rec-
65. See I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 39-40. It is also significant to note that the radon estimates
come from human epidemiological data. "Compared with the usual methods of calculating risks
from animal studies, this is an unusually reliable source of data." Eckholm, supra note 3, at Cl, col.
2; see also 51 Fed. Reg. 34056, 34057 (Environmental Protection Agency 1986) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 61) (reviewing standards for outdoor exposure to radon daughters and emphasizing that
"there is much less uncertainty in estimates of risk from radionuclide emissions because of the exten-
sive data base on the effects of human exposure to radiation").
66. See Beyond Benzene, supra note 61, at 2 (discussing the adequacy of such risk analysis); see
also I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 38 ("U.S. government publications on health risk analysis accept
this hypothesis."). Turiel notes that "[a]ctually, it may be worse than this. Some researchers argue
that part of the lung cancer attributed to smoking has exposure to radon daughters as a co-factor."
Id. at 40.
67. Different risk assessment models yield somewhat different results. The 1 in 5000 estimate is
by the National Council on Radiation Protection. Other organizations, including EPA, have some-
what higher risk estimates ranging up to over one in 1500. See Harley & Harley, supra note 64, at
201 (summarizing the results of the varying models); see also American Mining Congress v.
Thomas, 772 F.2d 617, 636 (10th Cir. 1985) (estimating the residual risk of lung cancer at 1.3 in 100
for 0.02 WL); Brambley & Gorfien, supra note 46, at 597 ("For an average dose of 0.25 WLM/yr,
this value of risk per unit of exposure [100 X 106 fatal lung cancers/WLM] attributes about 5% of
the observed number of fatal lung cancers in the United States to radon, which is not an unreasona-
ble estimate in view of the significance of cigarette smoking."); Ellett & Nelson, Epidemiology and
Risk Assessment: Testing Models for Radon-Induced Lung Cancer, in INDOOR AIR AND HUMAN
HEALTH, supra note 22, at 79, 82-84 (reviewing studies of variations of risk coefficient by age).
68. See Nero, supra note 6, at 36.
69. Nero, supra note 6, at 36.
70. See, e.g., Beyond Benzene, supra note 61, at 22-30 (EPA regulates air pollution risks in
excess of one in 100,000).
71. See Sharecoff, E.P.A. Plans New Curb on Radioactive Water, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1986, at
A17, col. 2.
72. As discussed above, the average house may produce a lifetime risk of 1 in 300, and a yearly
risk of 1 in 15,000. For most environmental hazards, a risk of merely 1 in 100,000 is high enough to
merit control measures. See Beyond Benzene, supra note 61, at 51-52.
73. This table is adapted from Hanchey, Uranium Mill Tailings and Radon, in Hearings On
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Source
EPA uranium mining standards
Sweden indoor standards
Union of Concerned Scientists
recommendations
Indoor standards in Florida
National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurement
Surgeon General's Grand Junction
CO Guidelines
Canadian Task Force on
Radioactivity
World Health Organization




0.3 WL - take prompt
remedial action
0.04 WL - take
remedial action
0.11 WL - maximum for
existing buildings
0.02 WL - maximum for
new houses
0.05 WL - remedial
action indicated
0.04 WL - remedial
action indicated
0.08 WL - remedial
action indicated
0.05 WL - remedial
action required
0.07 WL - remedial
action recommended
0.01 WL - existing
buildings
0.01 WL - new
buildings
ommendations are all roughly consistent in suggesting that the average home
(0.015 WL) does not require action, but that the more than one million high
exposure homes (0.08 WL) should undergo some remedial action.
The EPA's own indoor radon guideline is somewhat stricter, recom-
mending the mitigation of any indoor radon exposures in excess of 0.02 WL.74
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has criticized even this level as too
high.75 Moreover, EPA itself emphasizes that this level is neither "safe" nor
"acceptab[le]." 76 Nevertheless, an estimated five to eight million homes exceed
Uranium Ore Residues, supra note 48, at 509; Brennan & Turner, supra note 24, at 35; Nero, supra
note 6, at 40; Radon In Homes, supra note 3, at 670.
74. See EPA responses to congressional questions, in Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 274
(describing this "remedial action level"). EPA has varied over time in its indoor radon recommen-
dations, but a specific standard is promulgated for indoor radon concentrations in uranium mining
areas. See 40 C.F.R. § 192.12(b)(1) (1987). This standard provides that a "reasonable effort shall be
made to achieve, an annual average (or equivalent) radon decay product concentration (including
background) not to exceed 0.02 WL." Id.
75. See Letter from Robert E. Yuhnke, Attorney for the Environmental Defense Fund, to Rep.
James H. Scheuer, reprinted in Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 282-83. EDF argues that such a
standard would create a "false sense of security" in homes below the 0.02 WL guideline. Id. at 282;
see also 10 States To Receive EPA Aid in Program to Measure Radon Levels Inside US. Homes, 17
Env't Rep. (BNA) 971, 972 (Oct. 24, 1986) (EDF attorney Robert Yuhnke criticizes EPA recom-
mendation as several times too high).
76. Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 275.
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the concentrations of the EPA standard. 77
The degree of radon exposure that produces an unreasonable or unaccept-
able risk is still subject to much dispute. At present, there is a very plausible
argument that even the average American house presents an undue risk of can-
cer from indoor radon. A consensus now exists that a significant percentage of
the nation's overall housing stock poses unacceptable risks, in that several mil-
lion homes exceed generally recognized exposure guidelines. 78 Although ex-
isting regulatory standards need not be dispositive for common-law torts, courts
can be expected to use such standards as guidelines. 79 To date, one court has
spoken on the issue. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Industrial Commission,80 the
Colorado Supreme Court held that exposure to 0.15 WLM of radon" 'would be
sufficient to cause the disease [lung cancer] in the event of prolonged expo-
sure,'" and therefore is sufficient for liability under the State's occupational dis-
ease act.81 While the presence of liability for indoor radon exposures will
depend on factors other than risk, there is virtual unanimity in recognition of the
widespread nature and severity of the residential radon hazard.
E. Control Measures for Indoor Radon
Assuming that a hazardous situation exists in a given house, the availability
and effectiveness of remedial measures must be considered. Numerous different
measures are available to reduce indoor radon concentrations. In most circum-
stances the application of one or a combination of these measures will reduce
indoor radon levels significantly. The New Jersey Environmental Protection
Commissioner has flatly declared that "virtually any house or building can be
cleansed of potentially dangerous indoor levels of [radon] through sophisticated
ventilation and sealing techniques." 82 This section considers the efficacy and
cost of various available remedial measures.
77. See Eckholm, supra note 3, at Cl, col. 2-3 (referring to studies by EPA and by the Law-
rence Berkeley Laboratory). EPA itself estimates that 8.5 million homes currently exceed this stan-
dard. See EPA RADON REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. Other studies have suggested that even more
homes may exceed the EPA level. See EPA Issues Radon Guidance to Homeowners Advising When
Mitigation Efforts Are Needed, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 596 (Aug. 22, 1986) ("up to 12 percent of the
homes in the United States may have radon levels higher than what the agency considers 'safe' ").
Perhaps even thirty million homes may exceed the EPA recommended level. See GAO Says EPA
Best Suited To Lead Effort to Control "National Problem" of Radon Gas, 17 Env't Rep. 407 (BNA)
(July 11, 1986) (study found that 30% of 40,000 tested homes exceed EPA recommendation).
78. See Hanley, supra note 4, at 39, col. I ("The Federal Environmental Protection Agency said
in August that perhaps 8 million of the nation's 70 million homes had radon levels above its recom-
mended guideline. Radon experts in the scientific community are more conservative, saying that the
number may be closer to five million.").
79. See Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Bennett
the court authorized going beyond federal standards in establishing liability for radiation exposure.
Id. at 861-62.
80. 196 Colo. 56, 581 P.2d 734 (1978).
81. Id. at 59, 581 P.2d at 735-36 (quoting Climax Uranium Co. v. Smith, 33 Colo. App. 337,
342, 522 P.2d 134, 136 (1974)).
82. Sullivan, Radon Tests Are Urged For Homes in Parts of Jersey, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987,
at 62, col. 2.
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1. Sealing of Entry Points
Much radon seeps into houses through cracks in the floor or walls. Radon
entry may be limited by sealing these cracks and other possible entry points.
Certain surface sealants may successfully stop the entry of radon if applied on
cracks and around pipes and drains.83 In uranium mining communities, where
indoor radon exposures may be particularly high, "sealing of cracks has proved
relatively successful in reducing radon levels."'84
Sealing entry points has some significant limitations as a complete solution
to the indoor radon problem. First, sealing every possible entry point is difficult,
and "[e]ven if 90 percent of the entry points are sealed, the house can still draw
almost as much radon from the ground as it would through unsealed cracks."85
Partly for this reason, one study of the effectiveness of control measures con-
cluded that "sealing cracks is not particularly useful."'8 6 Second, the duration of
the protection offered by sealing entry points has been questioned.87 Although
sealants provide no panacea for controlling indoor radon, this remedy some-
times will be useful; even critical studies concede that sealing entry points typi-
cally reduces indoor levels by thirty percent.8 8 Though not completely effective,
the use of sealants may also be the most cost-effective response to indoor radon,
costing less than $750 for a one-time application in a representative house.8 9
2. Increased Ventilation
In some buildings, increased ventilation may be the most effective means of
reducing interior radon concentrations. Increased ventilation may take the form
of "deweatherization," or removal of insulating items that reduced the home's
original ventilation rate.90 Increasing the number of air changes per hour (ach)
will dissipate radon; for example, an increase from 0.75 ach to 1.0 ach could
reduce radon concentrations and the concomitant cancer risk by over one-
third.9 1 In many instances, however, such increased ventilation may be an "im-
practical remedy" because of increased energy costs or adverse effects on the
83. See Moeller & Fujimoto, supra note 36, at 1184; see also Nero, supra note 17, at 317
("[s]ealing surfaces, filling holes with impervious materials, or stopping transport via installation of
plastic or other barriers has proved effective in some cases that required remedial action").
84. Nero, supra note 17, at 311. See also Brennan & Turner, supra note 24, at 35 (listing"sealing floor slabs with polyurethane caulks" as one of several approaches that have worked with
great success in both Sweden and the United States).
85. Nero, supra note 6, at 38.
86. Cohen, supra note 52, at 179.
87. The sealant itself may last no longer than five years. See Fujimoto & Moeller, supra note
36, at 1190. Additionally, new cracks may develop over time as the house settles.
88. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 179.
89. See Moeller & Fujimoto, supra note 36, at 1188; see also Ways to make your house safer,
CONSUMER REP., July 1987, at 445 (estimating the cost at $300 to $500 and noting that "a skilled
do-it-yourselfer should be able to handle smaller jobs").
90. Theoretically, ventilation could be increased at very little cost simply by opening windows
in the home. This approach may be energy-expensive, present a risk to home security, and "wind
shifts make it almost impossible to maintain a constant air-exchange rate over time." Ways to make
your house safer, supra note 89, at 444.
91. See Brambley & Gorfien, supra note 46, at 599.
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comfort of residents. 92 Comparative studies show this ventilation option to be
among the most costly, with annual costs of approximately $500.93 Some of
these costs may be avoided, in cold climates, through use of ventilation with a
heat exchanger that retains heat from outgoing air.94 Although this frequently
cited approach may be effective for individual buildings, the heat exchanger may
be economically impracticable "for most of the country" and may not be effec-
tive in reducing high radon concentrations.
95
A more effective variant on increased ventilation involves installation of a
powerful fan underneath the house, in the crawlspace or basement, where exis-
tent. This process pulls contaminated air outside and simultaneously corrects
pressure differentials that might draw the air into the living areas of the home.
96
An EPA-sponsored study found this process to be uniquely effective in homes
with especially high radon levels. The test procedure had remarkable success,
lowering radon levels by more than ninety-seven percent in some instances.97
Further research may be required to demonstrate the overall effectiveness of this
approach, and costs are presently high,98 but installation by the homeowner and
efficiencies resulting from widespread application of the technique might bring
"ultimate capital costs" down to a very competitive $300 to $600 per home.99
This option would also involve annual operating costs estimated to be approxi-
mately $140. 00
3. Air Cleaning
When indoor pollution cannot be cured with the above methods, a home-
owner might choose one of a number of methods that directly remove contami-
nants from the indoor air. This is possible because radon decay products tend to
cling to airborne particles, which may be filtered out of the air. Various indoor
air cleaners are available, and cleaners in the category generally known as elec-
92. Nero, supra note 6, at 38.
93. See Moeller & Fujimoto, supra note 36, at 1188.
94. See 1. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 95; Nero, supra note 6, at 38. This procedure also can be
relatively expensive, however, ranging from $273 to $423 per year in one study. Moeller & Fuji-
moto, supra note 36, at 1188. Others have estimated the cost of purchase and installation at $400 to
$1500. See Ways to make your house safer, supra note 89, at 444.
95. Nazaroff, Boegel, Hollowell & Roseme, The Use of Mechanical Ventilation with Heat Re-
covery for Controlling Radon and Radon-Daughter Concentrations in Houses, 15 ATMos. ENV'T.
263, 269 (1981).
96. See Nero, supra note 6, at 38 (recommending this option for most homes with serious radon
problems).
97. Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 129. The homes originally had indoor radon concentra-
tions as high as 7.4 WL and were reduced to levels of 0.02 WL and below. Id.
98. Costs for the demonstration projects, however, ranged up to $10,000. Radon Hearings,
supra note 1, at 130. EPA now estimates professional installation costs to be $3000. See Hanley,
supra note 4, at 39, col. 3. Consumers Union estimates that a "system would cost about $1000 to
$2000 to install, and its fan would cost $140 a year or less to run." Ways to make your house safer,
supra note 89, at 445.
99. Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 131. EPA's most recent analysis suggests that "costs of
these techniques are expected to range from $100 to $5000 per home, with an average of approxi-
mately $1000 per home." EPA RADON REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
100. Radon Hearings, supra note 1, at 131.
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trostatic precipitators can remove some radon daughters from indoor air.10 1
Studies indicate that some of these devices may remove as much as forty-five to
eighty-five percent of the radon daughters found in a structure.'0 2 Many experts
are skeptical, though, about the overall effectiveness of these devices. Theoreti-
cally these devices could increase the radiation doses of building inhabitants. 1
0 3
At present, air cleaning is not regarded as an effective general solution to the
indoor radon problem.1 4
4. Summary
In most cases, some combination of the methods discussed above should be
able to reduce indoor radon concentrations to acceptable levels.' 05 Entry point
sealing and ventilation appear to be the most promising methods. Moreover,
reduction in radon concentrations usually can be accomplished at a relatively
reasonable cost, without requiring structural modifications. In some cases, how-
ever, repair costs could mount to several thousand dollars, ' 0 6 and in other more
extreme circumstances, there may be no effective remedy to high indoor radon
concentrations. 1
0 7
II. ESTABLISHING LIABILITY FOR RADON CONTAMINATION
Radon is without question a major public health problem, for which injured
individuals may seek remedies at common law. This section discusses possible
causes of action for homeowners faced with radon contamination. No clear-cut
101. See I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 98-99.
102. Moeller & Fujimoto, supra note 36, at 1186. These figures apply to unipolar ion generators.
Traditional electrostatic precipitators were estimated to remove 23% of indoor radon. Id.
103. As explained by one commentator,
One seemingly obvious approach to controlling radon is to remove airborne particles-and
hence the decay products that cling to them-with an air-cleaning device such as a fan
coupled to a filter. This does succeed in lowering the total concentration of decay prod-
ucts. However, with fewer particles in the air to cling to, a larger fraction of decay products
remain unattached. Unfortunately, these unattached products appear to cause a greater
radiation dose, so the net effect of air cleaning is unclear. Control of indoor radon is better
left to other techniques.
Nero, supra note 6, at 38; see also Jonassen, Removal of Radon Daughters by Filtration and Electric
Fields, 7 RADIATION PROT. Dos. 353 (1984); Radon in Homes, supra note 3, at 671 ("air cleaning in
some cases may increase radiation doses").
104. See, e.g., Brennan & Turner, supra note 24, at 37 ("the issue is complicated by the fact that
after filtering, the type of radon daughters (known as 'unattached') left behind may be more harm-
ful-reducing the effectiveness of the air cleaning. Until this is better understood, we do not recom-
mend this approach.").
105. EPA concludes that "indoor radon levels can be reduced substantially at relatively low
cost" but that "mitigation schemes are very house-specific, and more than one mitigation method
may have to be used to reduce radon to an acceptable level in a given house." EPA RADON RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 18.
106. An EPA study of more elaborate radon reduction measures found costs ranging from $4300
to $15,700 per home. GAO Says EPA Best Suited to Lead Effort to Control 'National Problem' of
Radon Gas, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 407 (July 11, 1986).
107. See Eckholm, supra note 3, at Cl, col. 2 ("[t]hose with high levels will have to be repaired,
at costs often ranging into the thousands of dollars; in rare cases, houses may have to be demol-
ished."). In one reported instance, a homeowner spent "$100,000 to pinpoint his problem and then
reduce radon levels that surpassed by 14 times the EPA's maximum safety standard." Galen, supra
note 3, at 8.
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liability yet exists under any established theory. Depending on the facts of the
individual case, homeowner plaintiffs may be able to recover under theories of
strict liability, implied warranty of habitability, negligence, or even fraud. This
section discusses the relevant legal standards for these varied theories of recov-
ery and their applicability to indoor radon exposure.
A. Strict Liability
In some respects, strict liability offers the most promise for homeowners
exposed to excessive indoor radon levels. This theory obviates the need to prove
misconduct by defendants and focuses the court's attention on the status of the
home itself. It has the further advantage of precluding contract-based defenses,
such as disclaimers. Plaintiffs have several potential obstacles to overcome, how-
ever, before they may successfully maintain a strict liability action for radon
exposure. These obstacles are analyzed below.
1. Application to Residential Housing
The tort concept of strict liability has been applied in a number of contexts,
probably the best known of which is products liability. Under certain circum-
stances, a home may be found to be a product, in which case a strict liability
standard will be available for radon actions. Strict liability in tort has been ap-
plied to builder-vendors '0 8 of housing since the 1965 landmark New Jersey case,
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons.10 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Schipper held a
real estate developer strictly liable for the injuries of a sixteen month-old child
who was severely burned as a result of a defective water heater. This was the
first case in which a court applied the products liability doctrine to real estate
defects. 10 Since Schipper, many courts have followed that decision's rationale
and have held developers liable for real property defects. Courts have adopted
two distinct approaches to this liability. Some courts have developed a cause of
action for strict liability in tort;" 1I others have used the same reasoning to create
an implied warranty of habitability." 2 Both theories of builder liability trace
their origins to the Schipper case, 1 3 which therefore assumes considerable im-
108. "Builder-vendor" has been defined as "one who buys land and builds homes upon that land
for purposes of sale to the general public." Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 123 n.10, 288 A.2d 771,
774 n.10 (1972); see also Park v. Sohn, 89 Ill. 2d 453, 461, 433 N.E.2d 651, 655 (1982) (builder-
vendor defined as "one who is engaged in the business of building, so that the sale is of a commercial
nature, rather than a casual or personal one").
109. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Another important early case is Waggoner v. Midwestern
Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967). In Waggoner, heavy rains caused flooding of the
house, and the court held a builder-vendor liable under strict liability.
110. Hiner, Strict Liability and the Building Industry, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 373, 373 (1985).
111. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (home-
owner recovered in strict liability from builder for failure of radiant heating system); Schipper, 44
N.J. at 90-91, 207 A.2d at 325-26; Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379 A.2d 297 (Law Div.
1977) (cause of action in strict liability existed against builder of home with inadequate sewerage
system); Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972) (homeowner recovered in strict
liability for roofing and plumbing defects).
112. See Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254
S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
113. Schipper, 44 N.J. at 80-82, 207 A.2d at 320-21.
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portance as a precedent for builder liability.
In Schipper, the lessee of a home built by defendants alleged negligence on
defendant's part in failing to install an automatic mixing valve, which would
have provided for a proper distribution of hot and cold water. The New Jersey
Supreme Court found that defendant could be held liable for breach of its duty
of care to those who would come into contact with its water system. 1 14 Plaintiff
also contended that defendant should be liable for the injuries due to a "breach
of warranty of habitability where a dangerous condition causes injury to a subse-
quent occupant. "115 The court found that both the implied warranty of habita-
bility and strict liability were causes of action available to the plaintiff.' 16 The
court discussed both theories, sometimes intermixing the two; 117 yet the court
clearly intended both theories to be available to homeowners.
The Schipper court emphasized a number of policy considerations that sub-
stantially influenced its decision. These included the relatively unequal bargain-
ing position of the homeowner in relation to the builder;' 18 the homebuyers'
reliance on the skill and representations of the builder;119 deep pocket considera-
tions of risk spreading; 120 and the buyers' relative inability to protect themselves
adequately from the risk of injury.121 The Schipper court also examined several
leading -product liability cases, including Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
Inc.,122 Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,' 23 and Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products,124 and concluded that there was no significant difference between the
mass production of homes and the mass production of automobiles. The court
stated:
The public interest dictates that if such injury does result from the
defective construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible de-
veloper who created the danger and who is in the better economic posi-
114. Id.
115. Id. at 88, 207 A.2d at 324.
116. Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325 ("IT]he warranty or strict liability principles of Henningsen and
Santor should be carried over into the realty field ....").
117. See Comment, Strict Tort Liability to the Builder Vendor of Homes: Schipper and Beyond?
10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 103, 106 (1983). At one point in Schipper the court stated that "when a
manufacturer presents his products for sale to the public he accompanies them with an implied
representation that they are reasonably fit for the intended use, and he is subject to an enterprise
liability." 44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325. Later in the opinion the court more clearly identified the
implied warranty of habitability, stating that "[w]hen a vendee buys a development house from an
advertised model,... he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its implied representation
that the house will be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for
habitation." Id. at 91, 207 A.2d at 325.
118. Schipper, 44 N.J. at 91-92, 207 A.2d at 326. ("Buyers of mass produced development
homes are not on an equal footing with the builder vendors and are no more able to protect them-
selves in the deed than are automobile purchasers in a position to protect themselves in the bill of
sale.")
119. Id. at 91, 207 A.2d at 325-26.
120. Id. at 91-92, 207 A.2d at 326.
121. Id. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
122. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (strict liability imposed for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability in sale of automobile with defective steering mechanism),
123. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (strict liability imposed on manufacturer of defective rug).
124. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (strict liability imposed for a defective
power tool).
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tion to bear the loss rather than by the injured party who justifiably
relied on the developer's skill and implied representation.
125
On its facts, Schipper appears to be a logical extension of strict products
liability to real estate; however, the doctrine may not be applicable in all real
estate situations. Clearly, not all builders are involved in mass production of
homes. Thus, some of the rationale for strict liability in Schipper may not apply
to a small or custom builder. In addition, the plaintiff's injury in Schipper was
caused by a defective product (the water heating system); however, in the radon
context, the injury arguably is not caused by a defective product, but rather by a
naturally occurring phenomenon in concert with certain intrinsic characteristics
of housing. Thus, the application of strict liability may become more problem-
atic in our context. Future application of strict products liability in the case of
indoor radon contamination must be examined somewhat more closely.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that one who
sells a defective product that is unreasonably dangerous is strictly liable for the
damage caused by the product.1 26 The first step in fully extending strict liability
to the sale of real property is to determine whether real estate is a "product"
within the meaning of section 402A. In Schipper the court analogized the mass
production of Levitt's homes to automobile production.127 Comment d of sec-
tion 402A specifically refers to automobiles as products within the meaning of
the section but gives no clear indication as to whether the drafters of the Re-
statement intended homes or buildings to be included as products. 128 Thus, the
Restatement itself gives no clue whether a home is a product, and case law must
be examined to determine a judicial definition.
The courts have looked to the policy rationales behind strict liability to
evaluate the characterization of a home as a product.1 29 Some of these policy
considerations include: (1) concern for public health and safety; 130 (2) the in-
125. Schipper, 44 N.J. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
126. Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
127. 44 N.J. at 90-92, 207 A.2d at 326.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, (d) (1965). See Comment, supra note 117, at
110-12 ("the plain words of the Restatement will not dictate the ultimate scope of strict tort
liability").
129. "The central issue seems to be whether these factors [underlying strict liability] are present
in the case and whether the policies of strict liability are advanced by characterizing a certain item as
a product." Comment, supra note 117, at 112-13.
130. See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
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ability of the buyer to inspect and identify some potential defects in the prod-
uet;13 1 (3) reliance by the buyer on the skill and expertise of the
manufacturer; 132 (4) deep pocket considerations of risk spreading;' 3 3 and
(5) mass production of the item.134 After examination of these policies underly-
ing strict liability, a growing number of courts have applied strict liability in tort
to the sale of new homes, particularly if constructed by a mass production devel-
oper.13 5 There is some remaining doubt as to whether a custom builder who
only constructs and markets a few homes each year is selling a product within
the meaning of section 402A.13
6
In Patitucci v. Prelich137 a New Jersey court held that a cause of action in
strict liability existed against a defendant-builder who was not a mass builder of
homes. The defendant was a developer of a tract of approximately twelve
homes, one of which plaintiff bought. The sewer system proved to be inadequate
and plaintiff sued defendant in strict liability. The court analogized plaintiff's
situation to that of a consumer injured by a defective automobile, noting that in
both cases the consumer is unable to fully inspect the product. 138 The court also
considered the defendant's construction expertise as a factor in assessing liabil-
ity-the defendant was in the business of selling homes, and thus the profession-
alism of the defendant was more important than the mass production factor. 1
39
131. Schipper, 44 N.J. at 91, 207 A.2d at 325.
132. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 228-29, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753
(1969); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 799-801 (Mo. 1972).
133. Schipper, 44 N.J. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
134. Kriegler, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 228, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53; Schipper, 44 N.J. at 90-91, 207
A.2d at 325-26.
135. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 104A (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [herein-
after PROSSER & KEETON] ("There is now a growing body of authority for applying strict liability in
tort for physical harm to persons and tangible things to the sale of new homes by the housing
merchant, especially those constructed by mass production developers ...."). See, e.g., Bastian v.
Wausau Homes, 620 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (applying Illinois law and finding mass-produced
home to be a product for strict liability purposes); Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612
S.W.2d 321 (1981) (holding that house is a product for purposes of strict liability law); Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (holding home to be product).
In other cases, courts have identified some aspect of a house as a product for purposes of finding
strict liability. See State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. [966) (defective installa-
tion of water heater), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex,
Civ. App. 1975) (defective bricks used in construction).
136. See Bastian v. Wausau Homes, 620 F. Supp. 947, 950 (N.D. I11. 1985) (court held strict
liability applicable to mass-produced homes and distinguished Illinois precedent holding that strict
liability was not appropriate for buildings that were not mass-produced).
137. 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379 A.2d 297 (Law Div. 1977).
138. Id. at 179-80, 379 A.2d at 298.
139. Id. at 179, 379 A.2d at 298. See Hiner, supra note 110, at 378; Comment, supra note 117, at
114-15 (The court basically disregarded the mass-produced factor). Two other cases have held a
home to be a product based on the builder's skill and the difficulty of inspection rather than the
mass-production of the homes. In Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972), the
court found that because of the nature of the structure, the purchaser must rely on the skill and
representations of the builder rather than relying on personal inspection. Thus, the purchase of a
home involves the purchase of "a manufactured product-[a] house." Id. at 799. The actual hold-
ing of Smith is stated in terms of implied warranty rather than strict liability. Id. at 796.
In McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 293, 398 A.2d 1283, 1292 (1979), the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the implied warranty of habitability "arises whenever a consumer
purchases from an individual who holds himself out as a builder-vendor of new homes-regardless
of whether he can be labeled a 'mass producer.' " Although this case does not specifically concern
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The court in Patitucci stated that the sewer system was a "'defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer,'" and therefore a strict liabil-
ity cause of action under section 402A existed. 
14
Not all of the policy rationales for extending section 402A liability to the
mass production builder may be applicable to the small custom home builder.
Clearly the custom builder is engaged in the business of selling a "product": a
home. Yet, the ability to absorb and reallocate a loss is not as readily available
to the small builder as it is to the mass producer. Commentators have been
critical of extending strict liability to these builders; as one stated,
To allow a judgment against this type of individual could result in
the loss of his business and perhaps more. This result would do more
than protect an innocent consumer. It would protect that individual to
the detriment of another who is unable to shift the risk or to use a
business loss.
14 1
Nevertheless, even though the small builder does not have the loss shifting
opportunities of the mass-producer, he is not totally without alternatives-he
could purchase insurance that would reduce the hardship caused by liability,
and he can raise any applicable defense such as assumption of the risk, product
misuse, or comparative fault. Liability under section 402A for radon contamina-
tion should not hinge on whether a builder is a mass-producer.
If a builder is not a mass-producer, the courts will be faced with a choice
that may require either placing liability on a small builder who is not able to
bear or shift the loss as easily as the mass-producer, or denying recovery to a
plaintiff who has been injured by a defective product. In the radon contamina-
tion context, the plaintiff's injuries are life-threatening, and public policy will
not be well served by categorically exempting from liability builders who are not
mass-producers.142 Aside from the public policy rationale and in either case, the
consumer is relying on the skill and knowledge of the developer. The number of
strict liability, the court discusses many of the policy issues applicable to the determination of
whether a home is a product-skill and knowledge of the builder, the ability of the builder to prevent
defects, lack of bargaining position of the buyer, and the fact that the builder introduced the article
into commerce. Id.
140. Patitucci, 153 N.J. Super. at 180, 379 A.2d at 299 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965)).
141. Comment, supra note 117, at 122. See Hiner, supra note 110, at 381-89. Hiner argues that
there are significant differences between the manufacturing process of a product and a building; these
include (1) the uniqueness of most buildings, as opposed to mass-produced products; (2) most build-
ings are built at the direction of the owner/developer and the construction can be modified at the
request of the owner, this type of negotiation is not possible in the manufacturing process of most
products; (3) buildings have a substantially longer useful life and are expected to be used by a larger
number of people than most mass-produced products, thus requiring differing maintenance and re-
pair standards. Id. Hiner concludes that on the basis of these differences most buildings should not
be considered products as to justify imposition of strict liability in tort unless public safety concerns
outweigh these differences. Id. After considering the public policy considerations underlying strict
liability, Hiner argues that strict liability is only applicable in real estate to mass-produced buildings.
Id. at 394.
142. Comment, supra note 8, at 1130 ("Because radon has severe adverse health effects, society
should place the burden where the least human exposure would result. Requiring builders to take
preventative steps during the course of construction would result in less total exposure of home
residents to radon gas.").
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units produced should not be the crucial factor in determining the applicability
of section 402A.14 3
The injured plaintiff is not automatically guaranteed recovery even if the
seller, whether a mass-producer or a custom builder, is constructing and market-
ing a product under section 402A. A plaintiff also must prove that a defective
condition existed in the product at the time construction was completed and that
the injury was proximately caused by that condition. In the radon context, this
means the plaintiff must prove that the source of the radon contamination is a
defective condition in the home.
2. Radon Contamination as a Defect
In order to establish liability under section 402A, the plaintiff must prove
that the product was in "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user."' 44 Thus, the product must be dangerous in a way that subjects persons
using the product to an unreasonable risk of harm. The product may be unrea-
sonably dangerous and therefore defective for the following reasons:
(1) a flaw in the product that was present in the product at the time it was
sold by the defendant;
14 5
(2) a failure by the manufacturer of a product to warn adequately of a risk
or hazard related to the way the product was designed; 146 or
(3) a defective design for the product. 14 7
These three methods of evaluating whether a product is defective under
section 402A must be examined to determine if a home contaminated by high
levels of radon gas is an unreasonably dangerous product.
a. A Flaw in the Product
A flaw in a product has been defined as a condition in the product that was
unintended and makes the product more dangerous than intended. 148 A flaw
created in the construction process makes a product, as a matter of law, unrea-
sonably dangerous because the product is more dangerous than intended.
149
143. Imposition of strict liability is further justified because the builder "stands in a better posi-
tion to test for radon and to take remedial or preconstruction steps to prevent radon from becoming
a problem in a home." Comment, supra note 8, at 1129-30. Moreover, "the cost of taking steps to
lower radon levels in the course of construction is much less expensive than taking those same
measures once the home is built." Id. at 1130.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
145. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(l). See also infra notes 148-55 and accompany-
ing text (discussing flaws in products).
146. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(2). See also infra notes 156-64 and accompany-
ing text (discussing failure to warn by the manufacturer).
147. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(3). See also infra notes 165-94 (discussing what
constitutes a defective design for the product and the state of the art defense).
148. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); MacPherson v.
Buick Motors, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
149. See generally Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30
(1973) (most cases deal with interpretation of what is a defect); Owen, Rethinking the Policies of
Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980) (the law currently is confused with many
different tests for defectiveness).
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The seller of the flawed, defective product is strictly liable for the consequences
of the flaw.150 This burden of proof is much easier for the plaintiff to meet than
the burden of proof for negligence liability, because there is no need to prove
that the defendant was negligent in creating or failing to discover the flaw.'
51
The obvious question in the radon context is whether radon contamination
is a "flaw" in the product-home. Three obvious possible flaws may be the source
of liability under this theory: (1) inadequate sealage; (2) inadequate ventilation;
and (3) contaminated building products. First, inadequate construction
processes may yield cracks or pressure differentials that allow radon gas to seep
into the home.' 52 Second, a plaintiff may contend that inadequate construction
processes "over-tightened" the house, failing to provide sufficient ventilation to
provide a means of escape for the radon gas. Third, a builder may have used
construction materials contaminated with high levels of uranium or radon.'
5 3
Even without identifying the precise source of radon, the plaintiff may argue
that high levels of indoor radon provide circumstantial evidence of a construc-
tion flaw. Preferably, a plaintiff will offer expert testimony as to the precise
source of the radon for the purpose of proving that a flaw exists in a radon
contaminated home. The expert evidence must show that the damage would not
have occurred but for a flaw in the product.
15 4
Arguably, these construction processes also may be classified as design de-
fects, and the outcome of the case may depend on how this issue is resolved.
Plaintiffs' prospects for success will be improved if radon levels can be traced to
identifiable product flaws. It often will be in the interest of builders to argue that
if a defect exists it is, in fact, best characterized as a design defect. In this way
they may be able to avoid liability, because they had no way of knowing that the
risk existed. This is the so-called state-of-the-art defense, discussed below.
155
b. Design Defect, Failure To Warn, and the State-of-the-Art Defense
Even if the construction technique was flawless, homeowners still may in-
voke strict liability by showing a defect in the design of the house. There are
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
151. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(2). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (implied warranty of merchantability cannot be ignored when
other express warranties are present).
152. Cracks in the foundation should be held to be a structural product flaw. In the past, courts
have found liability whenever such cracks have permitted indoor flooding. See Wawak v. Stewart,
247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966);
Elmore v. Blume, 31 111. App. 3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431 (1975).
153. Rather obviously, using dangerous products in the construction of a building is a flaw, as
held in numerous asbestos cases. See, eg., County of Johnson Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); see also Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska
1983) (subcontractor may be liable for installation of harmful formaldehyde insulation).
154. See generally Annotation, Products Liability: Proof of Defect Under Doctrine of Strict Lia-
bility in Tort, 51 A.L.R. 3d § 8 (1973) (proof of defect generally). "EThe nature and quality of the
circumstantial and other evidence that a court regards as sufficient to justify a finding that a flaw that
was traceable to a product when possession was surrendered by a target defendant is of primary
importance when the basis of recovery is a flaw in the product." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
135, § 99(2).
155. See infra notes 165-194 and accompanying text.
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basically two tests to determine if a product is unreasonably dangerous because
of a design defect. The first is a consumer contemplation test. Under this test "a
product is defectively dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the product's charac-
teristics." 156 While it would appear that a radon-contaminated home certainly
would be dangerously defective under this approach, some courts and commen-
tators have harshly criticized some aspects of this test.1 57 Today, the test most
often utilized by the courts in evaluating unreasonably dangerous design defects
is the risk-utility test.
Under the risk-utility approach, a product is defectively designed only if the
danger of the product outweighs the usefulness of that product. As Prosser and
Keeton state, "Under this test, a product can be said to be defective in the kind
of way that makes it 'unreasonably dangerous' if a reasonable person would con-
clude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of
the product." t58 While the benefits of homes and other types of housing are
considerable, the utility of certain radon-enhancing designs are not. Without a
doubt, the benefit of a home that has high levels of radon gas is substantially
outweighed by the danger of death due to lung cancer. Today there are construc-
tion techniques that allow homes to be built with a substantially reduced chance
of significant indoor radon concentrations. 159 Builders who do not utilize these
techniques should be liable for damage and injuries resulting from preventable
radon contamination.
When high radon concentrations are due to energy-conserving reductions
in ventilation, a court conceivably could find that the benefits of saving energy
156. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(3). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment i (1965) (article must be dangerous beyond expectations of consumer quali.
fied by what is the ordinary knowledge of community regarding that product).
157. Prosser and Keeton identify three reasons why consumer contemplation is inadequate as a
test for evaluating design defects: (1) under this test a victim could not recover if the design defect
was open or obvious, or if the purchaser was adequately informed concerning the defect; (2) the test
can lead to the characterization of a product as dangerously defective even though it clearly is not, as
in a new drug that is valuable to humanity but may have adverse side effects on a few persons; and
(3) the test is difficult to apply to real situations-what does a reasonable consumer actually contem-
plate? Does he contemplate unknown side effects or does he expect not to be affected by any adverse
risk unknown to him? The test can be manipulated to reach any result that a court or jury wishes,
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(3). See also General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545
S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (court used the consumer contemplation test to hold GM liable
for loss of plaintiff's eyesight when side window of automobile shattered and small, dull particles of
glass lodged in his eye), rev'd on other grounds, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
158. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(3). Prosser and Keeton identify three reasons
for concluding that the danger, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the products utility: (1) the
harmful consequences resulting from the reasonably foreseeable uses of the product caused by the
way the product was designed outweigh the benefits of the product measured in terms of human
desires and needs; (2) although the harmful consequences do not outweigh the benefits, there are
alternative, safer products available to serve the same human desires and needs; and (3) although the
harmful consequences do not outweigh the benefits, there is a feasible method to design a safer
product. Id.; see generally Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 1, 9 (1981)
(stating that "a product is unreasonably dangerous, and therefore defective if a reasonable person
would conclude that the danger in fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the
product").
159. See supra notes 82-107, and accompanying text.
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outweigh some risk of radon exposure. Even in this case, the energy efficient
house still could be found to be dangerously defective because of the builder's
"failure to warn" about a risk or hazard (radon) related to the way the product-
home is designed. 160 These failure to warn cases have been in the forefront of
much product liability litigation. In order to establish liability for failure to
warn, the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer knew or should have known
of the product's dangerous defect. 16 1 No liability will be imposed if the defend-
ant acted in a reasonable manner; that is, if he took the steps a reasonable manu-
facturer would take in presenting the product.162
If the radon hazard was unknown at the time of construction, a builder may
escape liability. Even in this situation, though, there also may be a continuing
duty to warn if the danger is discovered after the product is sold. 16 3 The duty to
warn, at the time of the sale or after the product is in the hands of the consumer,
is predicated on the information available to the manufacturer. 164 Thus, in the
radon contamination situation, the builder, at the minimum, has a duty to warn
the homeowner of the dangerous defect at the time the builder learns, or should
have learned, of the dangerous, defective condition. The question becomes at
what point the court will impose knowledge of the defective condition on the
builder.
Many courts have found that if a builder or manufacturer conformed with
the "state of the art" at the time the product was put into the consumer's hands,
then the product should not be considered unreasonably dangerous or, if consid-
ered defective, the defendant has an affirmative defense. 165 Thus, if a builder of
a radon-contaminated home can show that the risk of harm was unknowable
when the home was built, then the builder will not be held liable despite the
danger of the product, under either the design defect or failure to warn
theory. 166
160. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(2).
161. See Dalton v. Tulane Toyota, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 575, 578 (E.D. La. 1981); Woodill v. Parke
Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 33-34, 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (1980).
162. Prosser and Keeton state:
Although this ground of recovery (failure to warn] is sometimes referred to as strict liabil-
ity, it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence liability described as the sale of a
product in a defective condition, subject, however, only to the defenses and other limitia-
tions on liability applicable to strict liability rather than negligence.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(2).
163. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.) (manufacturer has
duty to remedy defects not discovered until after sale), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Bell Heli-
copter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (manufacturer has duty to prevent
continued use of defective product). See Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate
Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 892 (1983).
164. Schwartz, supra note 163, at 894-97.
165. See, eg., Needham v. White Laboratories, 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981); Karjala v. Johns-
Manville Prods., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 I11. 2d 26, 402
N.E.2d 194 (1980).
166. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99; Comment, 'Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod-
ucts Corp. . The Function of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 10 AM. J. L. &
MED. 93, 102-03 (1984); Note, Rise of the Phoenix-Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories: From the
Remnants of State of the Art Evidence Comes a New Standard for Design Defect-Failure to Warn
Cases, 16 U. TOL. L. REv. 1053, 1075 (1985).
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By recognition of the state-of-the-art defense, the courts are moving away
from a pure strict liability standard toward a more fault-based, negligence-type
standard. 167 There is some confusion as to the exact parameters of the state-of-
the-art defense. Most courts agree that the manufacturer's inability to prevent
the defect from occurring will not excuse liability; 168 however, there is some
diversity of opinion as to whether scientific inability to detect the danger in a
product design excuses the defendant from liability.' 69 There is also general
agreement that a product cannot be regarded as defectively designed merely be-
cause some technological advance after the manufacture or sale of the product
makes it possible to eliminate or substantially reduce the risk of injury. Most
courts hold that the evaluation of whether a safer product could have been
designed must be determined at the time the product was actually designed and
marketed. 170 The defendant has the burden of proving that "the risk of harm
was unknowable when the product was manufactured or sold." 17'
While the vast majority of courts in the country deny recovery if the manu-
facturer of a product can prove that the defect was undiscoverable given the
level of scientific knowledge at the time the product was manufactured or mar-
keted, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp. 172 rejected an absolute state-of-the-art defense in a strict liability action for
failure to warn. 173 In Beshada, workers exposed to asbestos from the 1930s
sought to recover from six asbestos manufacturers and distributors for personal
injury and wrongful death resulting from the exposure. The plaintiffs argued
167. "[T]he substantive content of the analysis in failure-to-warn and design defect cases is iden.
tical whether the claim is predicated upon a negligence or a strict liability theory." Birnbaum &
Wrubel, The N.J. Supreme Court Breathes New Life Into State-of-Art Defense, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17,
1984, at 22, col. 4.
Prosser & Keeton state:
If inability to discover a risk or hazard related to product design is regarded as a defense,
then it is true that the only practical difference between strict liability for design hazards
using a danger-utility test and negligence is a change in the burden of proof. The defendant
under so-called strict liability is required to prove both that reasonable or utmost care was
exercised and that the risk was undiscoverable.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99(2).
168. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978);
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
169. See generally Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent
in His Product, 32 INS. COUNS. J. 303 (1965) (when it is scientifically impossible to know the risk,
manufacturer cannot spread the risk and should not be liable for the defect); Willig, The Comment k
Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1978) (state-of-the-art
defense closely related to comment k limitation of strict liability); Note, supra note 166, at 1075-76
(concept of state-of-the-art defense to avoid liability varies among the courts).
170. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 99, at 701; Comment, supra note 166, at 104-05;
Comment, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Adding Uncertainty to Injury, 35 RUTGERS L.
REV. 982, 993-94 (1983).
171. See Comment, supra note 166, at 102.
172. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
173. Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549. The court stated:
Failure to warn of a risk which one could not have known existed is not unreasonable
conduct. But this argument is based on negligence principles. We are not saying what
defendants should have done. That is negligence. We are saying that defendants' products
were not reasonably safe because they did not have a warning.
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that lack of warnings and safety equipment justified imposition of strict liabil-
ity.' 74 The defendants raised the state-of-the-art defense, claiming that during
the time of production neither they nor the medical community could have
known that asbestos posed a serious health threat.175 The New Jersey Supreme
Court held defendants liable for failure to warn of the product's dangers even
though those defects were undiscoverable at the time the asbestos was mar-
keted. 176 Thus, the court clearly rejected the state-of-the-art defense. The court
in Beshada relied on three policies underlying strict liability as the rationale for
rejecting the state-of-the-art defense in the failure to warn situation-risk
spreading, 17 7 accident avoidance, 178 and simplification of the fact-finding
process. 17
9
An observation must be made concerning the Beshada case. It involved a
failure to warn, not a design defect situation. In fact, one year after Beshada, ifn
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,'1° the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a defend-
ant could introduce state-of-the art evidence on the issue of a defective design.s18
The court held that the jury'could consider "risks that the manufacturer knew
or should have known would be posed by the product."' 182 Thus, the court in
O'Brien reintroduced state-of-the-art evidence into the risk-benefit analysis of a
product. The utility of a product is based on the need for the product and possi-
ble alternatives, while the dangers of the product that the manufacturer knew or
should have known about and the adequacy of warnings are part of the risk
analysis.18 3 O'Brien raised serious questions concerning the proper role of state-
of-the-art evidence in design defect and failure-to-warn cases.'18
174. Id. at 197, 447 A.2d at 542.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549.
177. The New Jersey court found that the cost of the injuries should be imposed on the manufac-
turer who produced and distributed the product rather than the innocent victim, and that the impo-
sition of liability would not result in a price increase beyond an economically efficient level, but
would raise the price to reflect the cost of insuring against the possibility that the product might turn
out to be defective. Id. at 205-06, 447 A.2d at 547.
178. "The 'state-of-the-art' at a given time is partly determined by how much industry invests in
safety research. By imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, we create an
incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research." Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
179. The Beshada court noted:
[D]iscussion of state-of-the-art could easily confuse juries into believing that blameworthi-
ness is at issue. Juries might mistakenly translate the confused concept of state-of-the-art
into the simple question of whether it was defendants' fault that they did not know of the
hazards of asbestos. But that would be negligence, not strict liability.
Id. at 208, 447 A.2d at 548.
180. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
181. The defendants in O'Brien manufactured and distributed above-ground swimming pools
which were fitted with vinyl liners. The plaintiff dove into the pool and reached for the bottom with
his outstreched hands. His hands slipped on the vinyl lining and his head struck the bottom. The
plaintiff argued that the slippery vinyl should not have been used to line the pool even though there
was no alternative material available, thus the pool was defectively designed. Id. at 178-79, 463 A.2d
at 302-03.
182. Id. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305.
183. Id. at 183-84, 463 A.2d at 305-06.
184. The court in O'Brien stated, however, that mere compliance with the state-of-the-art is not
an absolute defense. The product may be in compliance with the state-of-the-art and yet fail the risk-
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The state-of-the-art dilemma in the New Jersey courts appears to have been
settled by the 1984 case, Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories.18 5 The Beshada deci-
sion was virtually unanimously criticized, 186 and O'Brien only created more un-
certainty in New Jersey products liability law.187 Feldman involved a failure-to-
warn action against a manufacturer of a prescription drug.188 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that state-of-the-art evidence is relevant to the determina-
tion of defectiveness, and only knowledge that is "reasonably obtainable and...
reliable" will be imputed to the manufacturer.189 The Feldman court did not
overrule Beshada, but limited it closely to its facts.190 The court in Feldman
stated, "If Beshada were deemed to hold generally or in all cases... that in a
warning context knowledge of the unknowable is irrelevant in determining the
applicability of strict liability, we would not agree." 191 Thus, the state-of-the-art
defense appears to be viable in strict liability actions for design defects or failure
to warn.
192
The question now becomes whether a builder of a radon-contaminated
home knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. Certainly, the
builders of homes built within the past five to ten years in radon-prone areas
should be aware of the problem and the deadly dangers. As the radon problem
becomes more widely publicized, even builders in other regions of the country
should be expected to investigate possible radon problems in their houses. A
much harder question exists for homes built fifteen or more years ago, before the
danger of indoor radon was widely known. These builders may be able to take
advantage of the state-of-the-art defense to absolve themselves of strict liability
to injured homebuyers. Clearly, today's builders in high radon concentration
areas have a duty to construct homes with radon dispersement devices and to
warn potential buyers of the dangers of radon contamination.
The perfect case for strict liability under prevailing principles would be one
where: (1) the builder-vendor was engaged in mass production sales; (2) radon
entered the house primarily through cracks in a faultily constructed basement;
(3) the sale took place recently; and (4) indoor radon levels substantially ex-
ceeded applicable standards. Most cases will not present such optimal facts.
benefit analysis. State-of-the-art evidence is just one factor in the risk-benefit equation. Id. at 183-
84, 463 A.2d at 305.
185. 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
186. See Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Revolution-orAberration-in Prod-
ucts Liability Law, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 786 (1984); Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two
Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. RE-v. 892, 901-05 (1983);
Comment, supra note 166; Note, Defeat for the State-of-the-Art Defense in New Jersey Products Lia-
bility: Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 14 RUTGERS L. J. 953 (1983); Note, supra note
166.
187. See Note, supra note 166, at 1086-89.
188. The plaintiff suffered tooth discoloration from the drug, Declomycin. The plaintiff based
the suit on the manufacturer's failure to warn of the tooth discoloration side effect. Feldman, 97
N.J. at 434, 435, 479 A.2d at 376-77.
189. Id. at 458, 479 A.2d at 388.
190. Id. at 455, 479 A.2d at 387.
191. Id. at 454-55, 479 A.2d at 387.
192. See also Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1979) (permit-
ting use of "scientific unknowability" defense).
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Plaintiffs exposed to high radon levels have a good prospect of proving a product
flaw, though, whenever foundation cracks are the source of a high indoor radon
level. Proof of a design defect or failure to warn is promising for sales conducted
after 1976.193 A very high standard should be imposed for future construction,
and the presence of high radon levels itself should provide presumptive evidence
of a housing defect.
194
B. Implied Warranty of Habitability
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. 195 is not only a landmark case in the develop-
ment of strict liability in real estate transactions, but it is also a landmark in the
area of implied warranty. The court in Schipper held that a builder impliedly
warrants that the home he sells is " 'built in a workmanlike manner and is suita-
ble for habitation.' "196 As stated previously, the court in Schipper interchanged
strict liability and implied warranty in its analysis, 197 even though strict liability
is based in tort law, while the implied warranty is based in contract. Despite its
contract origins, many courts, as well as commentators, recognize that the im-
plied warranty owes much to tort law, though no showing of negligence is re-
quired. 198 The implied warranty of habitability differs from strict liability in a
number of ways, most notably in the elements of notice, 199 privity, 2°° and dis-
claimer. 201 These elements may raise serious obstacles to an implied warranty
of habitability cause of action against a builder of a radon-contaminated
home.20
2
Prior to the recognition of the implied warranty of habitability, the rule
193. The precise date after which builders "should have known" of the radon hazard will be
subject to considerable dispute. In the context of fraud, one court has held that a defendant "did not
know or have reason to know of the danger of radon gas in 1969, when the blocks at issue were sold,
and did not know or have reason to know of such a danger until near the end of the 1970's." Wayne
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1984). Others might place the relevant date
somewhat earlier. The federal government first began issuing reports on the indoor radon hazard in
1976. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, Guimond & Shaw, A Preliminary Evaluation of the Control of Indoor
Radon Daughter Levels in New Structures, EPA No. 520/4-76-018 (1976), cited in NRC supra note
14, at 319.
194. Radon now has received considerable attention in even nonscientific sources, and the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency has issued free advice to builders on minimizing indoor radon concen-
trations. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987, at 62, col. 5. Builders now should be on notice to avoid
constructing houses with high indoor radon concentrations or, at minimum, to warn prospective
buyers of the presence of such concentrations.
195. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
196. Id. at 94, 207 A.2d at 327 (quoting Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 84, 388 P.2d 399,
402 (1964)).
197. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
198. See Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978) (implied warranty and
strict liability are "two labels for the same legal right and remedy"); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 6
Mass. App. Ct. 346, 376 N.E.2d 143 (1978) (implied warranty and strict liability are the same ac-
tion); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942) (warranty is
implied on the basis of public policy rather than contractual liability). Professor Prosser has labeled
the implied warranty "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 800 (1966).
199. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
202. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 11-24, at 424-25 (1977) ("An action in
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relating to the sale of real property was "caveat emptor. ' '20 3 After World War
II, the housing industry in this country underwent a great change. As one com-
mentator stated, "the building industry outgrew the old notion that the builder
was an artisan and took on all the color of a manufacturing enterprise, with
acres of land being cleared by heavy machinery and prefabricated houses being
put up almost overnight."' 2° 4 With this change in the building industry, increas-
ing pressure was brought to change or abandon the caveat emptor doctrine in
favor of recognition of some type of implied warranty in the sale of new
homes.20 5 Another factor in the development of an implied warranty concept in
the sale of new homes was the preceding development of implied warranties in
sales of personal property. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the
sale of personal property could carry implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose. 20 6 The difference in treatment between personal
and real property has been viewed as indefensible. One commentator noted the
irony of a legal system that "offer[ed] greater protection to the purchaser of a
seventy-nine cent dog leash than it [did] to the purchaser of a 40,000-dollar
house."
20 7
As a result of the increasing pressures to abolish the doctrine of caveat
emptor, the majority of states adopted some type of implied warranty of habita-
bility.20 8 While most courts recognize that the builder-vendor of a new home
impliedly warrants some level of workmanship in the home, there is significant
disagreement as to what level of workmanship the builder warrants. Some
courts define the warranty as a guarantee that the home will have no defects that
substantially impair the enjoyment of the home.20 9 Other courts analogize the
warranty of habitability to the UCC's warranty of merchantability: the home
must be of average quality, pass without objection in the trade, and be fit for the
purpose of living in it.210 Still other courts define the implied warranty more
narrowly, finding it applicable only when the home is absolutely uninhabit-
strict tort liability is ordinarily preferable to a contract warranty action because questions of privity,
notice and disclaimer are for the most part removed.").
203. The rule of "caveat emptor" (let the buyer beware) is thought to have originated in the late
sixteenth century and was particularly prevalent in the nineteenth century when judges regarded the
purchase of land as a "game of chance." Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE
L.J. 1133, 1187 (1931).
204. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
205. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 541 (1961); Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37
MINN. L. REV. 108 (1953); Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633, 651 (1965).
206. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1978).
207. Haskell, supra note 205, at 633.
208. Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL
EsT. L.J. 291, Table I at 303-06 (1980) (36 states and the District of Columbia recognize the implied
warranty of habitability).
209. Wagner Constr. Co. v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
210. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 111, 2d 31, 42, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (1979). See
also Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978) (implied warranty extends to
cooperative apartments); Wimmer v. Down E. Properties, Inc., 406 A.2d 88, 92 (Me. 1979) (implied
warranty that house built in "reasonably skillful and workman like manner" and suitable for
habitation).
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able. 21 1 No matter how a court may specifically define the implied warranty of
habitability, the radon-contaminated home should be found uninhabitable under
any definition currently in use. Thus, the builder-vendor who sells a radon-con-
taminated home is likely to have violated an implied warranty of habitability.
Liability for breach of the implied warranty of habitability may not be auto-
matic. Several jurisdictions have applied the UCC by analogy to real property
situations involving the implied warranty of habitability. 212 UCC section 2-
607(3) requires that the buyer notify the seller of a breach of warranty within a
reasonable time or the buyer will not be allowed to assert the breach in an action
for damages.2 13 Some courts have focused on the necessity of giving notice of the
defect to the builder in order to allow him to attempt to repair the defect.
2 14
Other courts have emphasized the necessity of allowing the builder an opportu-
nity to correct the defect.2 15 Thus, a buyer wishing to bring a breach of implied
warranty claim against the builder may have to give notice of the defect to the
builder prior to the institution of the suit or be barred from recovery.
2 16
Most jurisdictions hold that privity of contract is a prerequisite for con-
tract-based liability.2 17 There is a growing trend, however, to abandon or limit
the privity requirement in implied warranty cases. In 1976 the Indiana Supreme
Court held that a showing of privity between the builder and purchaser was no
longer necessary to maintain a cause of action for implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. 2 18 The court limited its holding to latent defects that were discovered after
the purchase. The court stated, "The standard to be applied in determining
whether or not there has been a breach of warranty is one of reasonableness in
light of surrounding circumstances. The age of a home, its maintenance, the use
to which it has been put, are but a few factors entering into this factual determi-
nation at trial." 219 A growing number of courts have abolished the privity re-
quirement for an implied warranty of habitability action; 220 however, some
211. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976) (en banc) (buckling, sinking, and
cracking of patio slab and separation of door frame from wall did not affect habitability of home).
212. The UCC is not directly applicable to real estate transactions. See U.C.C. § 2-304 official
comment 3 (1978) (transactions involving real property are outside the UCC). However, some deci-
sions have used the UCC as a guideline for implied warranty of habitability liability. See Capra v.
Smith, 372 So. 2d 317 (Ala. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 372 So. 2d 321 (Ala. 1978); Tassan v.
United Dev. Co., 80 Ill. Ct. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980); Matulunas v. Baker, 569 S.W.2d
791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
213. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1978).
214. See e.g., Wagner Constr. Co. v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
215. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1974); Matulunas v. Baker, 569 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
216. In Noonan, 403 N.E.2d at 1149-50, the Indiana Court of Appeals indicated that receipt of
the complaint by the defendant was insufficient notice.
217. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 572-73, 378 A.2d 599, 601 (1977) ("This
is not a mass marketing situation in which the defendant has attempted to insulate itself from liabil-
ity behind a wall of intermediaries. Rather the defendant contracted directly with the original pur-
chaser .. "); Oliver v. City Builders Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1974) ("It would be strange
indeed, if, when the original purchaser conveyed the property to another, that his vendee could
resort to the builder for damages for deficiencies in workmanship or materials which the original
purchaser ... accepted.").
218. Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 iN.E.2d 619 (1976).
219. Id. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 621.
220. See, e.g., Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowicz v.
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courts continue to recognize the privity requirement and bar implied warranty
actions by subsequent purchasers.
Another potential bar to liability for breach of the implied warranty of hab-
itability is the contract disclaimer. Although disclaimers are generally disfa-
vored by the courts, 22 1 they are not held to be absolutely against public
policy. 222 Many courts will enforce the disclaimer if it is conspicuous and
clearly stated.223 Therefore, in the contract of sale, the builder can waive the
implied warranty that the home is built in a workmanlike manner and fit for
human habitation.224 The buyer who is injured by a defect in the home will not
be able to recover under the implied warranty of habitability if an effective dis-
claimer is used. The disclaimer would be especially strong if it specifically refer-
enced radon risks.
Finally, the implied warranty of habitability only guarantees that a home
will be free from unreasonable defects. 225 A home with high radon levels would
seem to be unreasonably defective, for the health reasons discussed above. A
builder might argue, however, that the home itself is habitable, and the risk
exists due to external, natural factors beyond his control. As we have seen, how-
ever, indoor radon levels are largely dependent on characteristics of the home
itself. Furthermore, this theory was clearly rejected in the Pennsylvania case of
Elderkin v. Gaster.226 In Elderkin the court held that a home with an unhealthy
water supply violated the implied warranty of habitability, even though the
home itself and associated well were constructed soundly. 227 Under this prece-
dent, a builder may be found liable for locating a house at a site where the water
Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342
N.E.2d 619 (1976); Hermes v. Staidno, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (Law Div. 1981); Gaito v.
Auman, 313 N.C. 243, 327 S.E.2d 870 (1985); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981); Ter-
linde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 146
(Tex. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
221. See generally Comment, Liability of the Builder-Vendor Under the Implied Warranty of
Habitability.-Where Does It End?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 593, 594-96 (1979) (examining courts'
treatment of disclaimer clauses in sales contracts for new houses).
222. See Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 43, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159
(1979); Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 22, 364 N.E.2d 986, 989 (1977); Gupta v. Ritter
Homes, 646 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1983). One commentator has argued that a disclaimer of a
warranty of habitability in the sale of new construction should be held unconscionable and against
public policy. Haskell, supra note 205, at 654.
223. Conyers v. Malloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 21, 364 N.E.2d 986, 989 (1977) (disclaimer too
general to put buyers on notice); MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 919 (rex. Civ. App. 1977)
(disclaimer not conspicuous).
224. But see Comment, supra note 8, at 1146-51 (arguing that disclaimer should be inapplicable
in radon context, even when it is clear and unambiguous).
225. See, eg., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965); Wag-
goner v. Midwestern Dev., 83 S.D. 57, 68, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1972).
226. 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972).
227. Id. at 130, 288 A.2d at 777; see also Note, Elderkin v. Gaster-The Pennsylvania Experi-
ence With Implied Warranties in Sales of New Homes, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 172, 177-78 (1973) (The
Elderkin court's broad language extends implied warranty of habitability to latent site conditions).
It has been argued that a "primary function" of housing is the protection of inhabitants from the
"elements," and builders should not complain when they have failed to do so. Morrissy & Rupp,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Step Toward Protecting Home Buyers, 23 TRIAL LAW
GUIDE 137, 144-48 (1979) (quoting Goggins v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 48 Ill. App. 3d 103, 106,
365 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1977)).
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contained high radon levels. Liability for other cases of high radon exposure
would be even clearer because, unlike in Elderkin, the house itself will contrib-
ute to the risk.
The owner of a radon-contaminated home may be able to bring a successful
cause of action against the builder for breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility. Clearly, a home with unusually high radon levels is very hazardous and
not fit for human habitation. An owner should first give notice to the builder of
a radon problem and allow him an opportunity to repair damage and install
devices that prevent future unacceptable radon concentrations. If the damage is
not repaired, a suit for breach of the implied warranty of habitability is war-
ranted. A disturbing trend in this area, however, is the ability of the builder to
escape liability through a disclaimer. In the typical situation, the builder and
the buyer do not share equal bargaining power. Even if the disclaimer is clear
and conspicuous, it is unlikely that the buyer realizes that he is waiving his right
to receive damages from the builder if the home is not fit for human habitation
because of radon contamination. Presumably builders in states that allow dis-
claimers will incorporate a clear and concise disclaimer in all contracts of sale.
As a result, a buyer may then have to rely on strict liability, negligence, or fraud
as a basis for a cause of action against the builder.
C. Negligence
The purchaser of a home with high indoor radon concentrations may have
a cause of action against both the builder and architect under a traditional negli-
gence theory.22 8 To succeed the buyer must show that the defendant breached
his duty to build the home in such a way so as to protect the purchasers from an
unreasonable risk of injury, and that this breach of duty proximately caused the
injury.229 The law of negligence imposes a duty of care upon the builder if a
reasonable person in the same situation would have anticipated that the harm or
injury was likely to result.230 Thus, the builder of a radon-contaminated home
will be liable for the resulting injuries if he knew or should have known that the
228. See, eg., Stanley Consultants, Inc. v. H. Kalicak Constr., 315 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mo. 1974)
(architect liable for negligent preparation of plans); Palmer v. Brown, 127 Cal. App. 2d 44, 58-59,
273 P.2d 306, 316 (1954) (architect liable for negligent inspection).
229. See, e.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 579-81, 498 P.2d 1179, 1181 (1972)
(finding contractor negligent for installation of plate glass door rather than safety glass door); Wag-
goner v. Midwestern Dev., 83 S.D. 57, 62, 154 N.W.2d 803, 806 (1967) (requiring knowledge that
omission or act involved danger or harm to another); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925,
935 (Wyo. 1981) (finding developer-builder-vendor liable for damages from a landslide). See gener-
ally PROSSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 30 (elements of cause of action founded upon negli-
gence); Annotation, Liability of Builder- Vendor or Other Vendor of New Dwelling for Loss, Injury,
or Damage Occassioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3d 383, 397-409 (1969) (builder-
vendor liability for negligence in construction).
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 289, 298 (1965). See Coburn v. Lenox Homes,
Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 575, 378 A.2d 599, 603 (1977) ("It is clear that a defectively constructed house
is likely to result in damage to the owner and there is no reason why the builder-vendor should not
be liable for the effects of his negligence if they were foreseeable."); Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d
142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("In our judgment, building contractors should be held to the
general standard of reasonable care for the protection of anyone who may foreseeably be endangered
by their negligence.").
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home was built in such a way as to allow radon contamination. Once again the
state of scientific knowledge concerning radon will be important. 231 If a reason-
able builder did not and could not have known of the possibility of radon con-
tamination, then no duty of care will be imposed. A plaintiff, however, might
demonstrate that the builder had a continuing duty to warn and was negligent
for failing to inform the purchaser when the radon problem became known.
232
Nevertheless, negligence will present a more difficult burden of proof for a plain-
tiff to meet than the burden of proof of strict liability or the implied warranty of
habitability.
If a court finds that a builder owes a duty to the purchaser of the home to
protect against radon contamination, the plaintiff then must prove that the
builder breached that duty by failing to exercise the care and skill of an ordinary
builder under the circumstances. 233 An alternative claim may be made against
the builder for negligent siting of new construction in high radon areas.
234
Houses built in violation of existing regulatory recommendations for radon
might be considered presumptively to breach this duty of due care.235
Simply proving defendant's negligence is not sufficient, however; the plain-
tiff must also show that the failure to exercise due care in the construction of the
home proximately caused the injury or damage.236 Builders faced with such a
claim may raise a proximate cause defense, alleging that they are not responsible
for the radon contamination. This defense would emphasize that, in most in-
stances, radon gas does not enter the home as a direct result of negligent con-
struction techniques, but rather through natural methods-radiation-
231. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
232. See, eg., Brown v. Merrow Mach. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (D. Conn. 1976) (breach of
continuing duty to warn of hazard from sewing machine could constitute negligence).
233. See, e.g., Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 256, 678 P.2d 41, 48 (1984) (builder owes
tenant common-law duty of ordinary care to perform in a workmanlike manner); Mitchem v. John-
son, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 73, 218 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1966) (vendor-builder has duty to perform with
ordinary skill and care); Northwestern Bell Tel. v. Henry Carlson Co., 83 S.D. 664, 669, 165 N.W.2d
346, 349 (1969) (remodeling contractor not liable for damages from seepage after unusually heavy
rain, where he acted as an ordinarily prudent person would in similar circumstances). See generally
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 32 (defining the reasonable person standard).
234. See Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 28, 377 P.2d 889, 894, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 693 (1963)
(negligent construction on unfit site); Village Dev. Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 305, 526 P.2d 83, 84
(1974) (developer liability for negligent siting in flood plain); Westwood Dev. Co. v. Esponge, 342
S.W.2d 623, 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (developer liable for building house on landfill); House v.
Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 435, 457 P.2d 199, 204 (1969) (developer liable for construction of
house on site with unstable soil); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 935 (Wyo. 1981)
("builder-vendor liable for damage from landslide because of duty to select a safe site for such
construction").
235. Violation of an applicable statutory or administrative requirement, such as in a building
code, is often considered to be negligence per se. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 36, at 230
("once [a statutory] breach has been established, probably a majority of the courts hold that the issue
of negligence is thereupon conclusively determined"). See, e.g., Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v.
Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 39, 366 A.2d 101, 107 (1976). In the case of radon, however, the existing
standards are not binding regulations but recommended guidelines, and thus this strict rule may not
apply. The presence of such guidelines, at minimum, should provide persuasive evidence of negli-
gence. See Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 65, 253 A.2d 167, 171 (1969) (even when "regulation is
not applicable," its requirements "reveal an awareness by an expert public agency of the existence of
a hazard").
236. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 30. See Porter v. Sadri, 38 Wash. App. 174, 176-77,
685 P.2d 612, 613 (1984).
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contaminated gas or water or the ground underlying the home.237 The plaintiff
in turn must show that the builder's actions were the proximate cause of the
excessive radon contamination and that contamination resulted in the plaintiff's
injuries. In many cases, a plaintiff should be able to show that either negligent
construction or negligent siting of the home exists. In addition, since radon is
present at some level in all houses, the homeowner must show that elevated
exposures are caused by negligent construction, siting, or design of the home.
At present, it is unclear what threshold of radon exposure will be required, but a
fair guess is that the plaintiff will be required to show exposures at least in excess
of applicable standards.
238
Another potential roadblock to a successful negligence action against the
builder of a radon contaminated home is the requirement of privity. Remote
purchasers, those not in contractual privity with the builder, and injured third
parties may be prevented from bringing an action against the builder because of
the lack of privity.239 While most jurisdictions have abandoned or modified the
privity doctrine,24° not all courts have done so. 241
Clearly the negligence cause of action is not the best option available to the
homeowner injured as a result of radon contamination. In defense, the builder
can argue that he owes no duty of care to the owner with respect to radon expo-
sure. If a duty is found, the builder may contend that he was not negligent
under the prevailing knowledge and circumstances; and even if the builder is
found to have negligently constructed the home, the remote purchaser may be
barred from recovery due to a of lack of privity with the builder. Nevertheless,
in many cases negligence may provide an effective remedy for radon contamina-
tion.242 Where privity bars an action, the remote purchaser's best option may be
237. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
238. While compliance with existing recommendations should provide some evidence that a
builder-vendor was not negligent, this fact will not insulate defendants from liability. "Such a stan-
dard is no more than a minimum, and it does not necessarily preclude a finding that the actor was
negligent in failing to take additional precautions." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 36, at
233. Given the relatively high level of residual risk remaining even at the government-recommended
levels, see supra note 60 and accompanying text, it is certainly plausible for a court to find negligence
even for homes with lesser exposures.
239. The rationale for the privity requirement is that once the building is finished and accepted
by the owner, the owner then becomes responsible for the defects even if caused by the builder's
negligence. Miller v. Davis & Averill, Inc., 137 N.J.L. 671, 674-75, 61 A.2d 253, 255-56 (1948).
240. Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 141 Ariz. 514, 516, 687 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1984); Coburn
v. Lennox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 572, 378 A.2d 599, 602-03 (1977); Oates v. JAG., Inc., 314
N.C. 276, 279-81, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224-25 (1985); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 398, 271 S.E.2d
768, 769-70 (1980). See generally Annotation, Liability of Builder of Residence for Latent Defects
Therein as Running to Subsequent Purchases from Original Vendee, 10 A.L.R.4th 385, 393-402
(1981) (privity requirement for remote purchasers).
241. See Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("In our judgment,
building contractors should be held to the general standard of reasonable care for the protection of
anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by their negligence. But this is for our Supreme Court
to decide. We urge it to do so." (citations omitted)).
242. See Hiner, supra note 110, at 397 ("[R]equiring injured plaintiffs to prove negligence
against the contractor and architect will not divest them of effective remedies; the plaintiffs in Schip-
per, Kriegler, and State Stove Manufacturing Co., who recovered against builders in strict liability
actions, also made out causes of action in negligence.") (citations omitted).
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a cause of action against the seller or builder based on fraudulent
misrepresentation.
D. Fraud
Fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure of the existence of danger-
ous levels of radon gas in the home by the builder, seller, or real estate broker
who was involved in the sale of the home may provide a purchaser with a fraud
action. At common law, the well-established elements for a cause of action in
fraud or deceit are:
(1) a false representation of a fact by the defendant;
(2) knowledge of the defendant that the statement is false (or that he
lacked of a sufficient basis for making the statement);
(3) intent to induce the plaintiff to rely on the information;
(4) justifiable reliance on the information, by the plaintiff; and
(5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of his reliance.
243
The builder, seller, and real estate broker who know of serious radon con-
tamination of the home have a duty to disclose this information to the potential
buyer.244 Yet, in many instances some of these potential defendants may not
have actual knowledge of the radon problem. In any event, the plaintiff's burden
of proof in a fraud action may seriously inhibit the viability of this remedy for
radon contamination. The chances of a successful cause of action in fraud or
deceit is diminished considerably, if the owner of a radon-contaminated home
must prove that the defendant knew of the degree of radon contamination at the
time of the sale of the home.
Many courts today, however, will hold the defendant liable for negligent
misrepresentation. The basic difference between intentional and negligent mis-
representation is that the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant
made the misrepresentation with an intent to deceive or with knowledge of the
falsity of the statement.245 Thus, even if a statement is made with an honest
belief that it is true, it may provide the basis of a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation. 246 Under this standard, once a builder, seller, "or broker
makes a statement concerning radon contamination, it must be accurate.
247
This does not solve the problem, for in many cases the defendant will have
243. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 105, at 728.
244. See, e.g., Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 265-67, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131-33 (1983)
(broker knew that home was site of multiple murder and should have disclosed that fact to buyer);
Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 (1963) ("[W]here the
seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known or
accessible only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to, or within the reach of the...
buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.").
245. See Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 111. App. 3d 257, 259-60, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625
(1979); Berryman v. Reigert, 286 Minn. 270, 275-76, 175 N.W.2d 438, 442 (1970).
246. Prosser and Keeton state that "[a] representation made with an honest belief in its truth
may still be negligent, because of lack of reasonable care in ascertaining the facts, or in the manner of
expression, or absence of the skill and competence required by a particular business or profession."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 107 (citations omitted).
247. Cf. Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 111. App. 3d. 257, 259-60, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625
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made no affirmative statements concerning radon contamination. In fact, the
defendant may not have had any idea that a possible problem existed. The ques-
tion then becomes one of constructive knowledge; whether the builder, seller, or
broker can be liable for failure to disclose a condition of which she was unaware.
In many instances, the cause of action will turn on whether the silence of a
defendant can be deemed to be fraud.248 As a general rule, a seller of real prop-
erty must disclose latent defects of which he has knowledge or which are reason-
ably discoverable. 249 Clearly, a real estate broker must disclose latent defects
which are within his knowledge;250 however, there is much confusion as to what
is the broker's duty to the purchaser concerning latent defects which are not
within the broker's actual knowledge.25 1 Radon concentrations should be con-
sidered such a latent defect.25 2 For housing transactions of a decade or more
ago, brokers, vendors, and others may not be expected to have checked for a
radon problem. Concerning more recent sales, however, the courts may hold
that high radon levels were reasonably discoverable 253 and that the defendants
are liable for constructive knowledge of the risk.254 At a minimum, as knowl-
edge of radon and its effects on residential real estate grows, the builder, seller,
and real estate broker of homes in radon-prone areas must be expected both to
determine if a radon problem exists and to disclose that problem to potential
purchasers.
2 55
Certainly, as a matter of course, builders in new home sales and real estate
brokers in resale homes will want to suggest to the buyer that a routine inspec-
tion for radon contamination be conducted at the time of sale, just as termite
inspections are now routine for resale homes in most areas of the country. A
radon test at the time construction is completed, and at periodic intervals there-
(1979) (allowing a finding of fault only where the broker "knew or should have known that the
representation might be false").
248. Traditionally, silence could not be fraud. Now, however, the Restatement provides: "A
vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition, whether natural or
artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee
and others upon the land .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353(:) (1965).
249. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984)
(broker has duty to disclose facts which are known to him or accessible on reasonable investigation).
See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 106 (discussing duty of disclosures).
250. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984) (broker
has duty to disclose facts which are known to him or accessible on reasonable investigation); Reed v.
King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 267, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1983).
251. See Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to Investigate,
32 VILL. L. REv. 939 (1987).
252. High radon levels cannot be detected by visual inspections or otherwise be obvious to the
buyer. A dangerous situation "cannot be detected except by special devices." Berreby, supra note
33, § 3, at 6, col. 2.
253. Liability may exist where the seller of housing "knows or has reason to know of the condi-
tion, and realizes or should realize the risk involved." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 353(1)(b) (1965).
254. The National Association of Realtors now requires informing buyers "if the agent believes a
home is in a radon-prone area." Hanley, supra note 4, at 39, col. 3.
255. There is even some precedent for requiring vendors of homes to inform purchasers of poten-
tial radiation hazards. See Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (failure to
inform purchasers that home was located on top of uranium mill failings may give rise to action for
fraud).
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after, could prevent or greatly mitigate health problems caused by radon con-
tamination and avoid costly litigation.
2 56
III. REMEDIES FOR RESIDENTIAL RADON CONTAMINATION
Establishing a standard of liability for high levels of indoor radon does not
fully resolve the controversy. The measure of damages in these cases is by no
means certain. The primary harm of indoor radon is its induction of lung can-
cer, which may be difficult to prove at common law. Plaintiffs undoubtedly will
attempt to recover health-related damages for cancer, whether already sustained
or merely anticipated. In addition, owners of radon-contaminated housing will
seek to recover demonstrable property damages and the costs of correcting the
conditions causing the high indoor concentrations. This section discusses the
availability of these respective forms of damages.
A. Health-Related Damages
Damages to a homeowner's health should be recoverable under any of the
liability theories discussed above.257 This section will address the ability of
plaintiffs to recover damages associated with a future risk of radon-induced can-
cer. When cancer has actually resulted in radon-exposed family members, they
may sue for actual damages such as medical expenses and pain and suffering;
however, such a post facto action has significant practical limitations. 258 The
development of this cancer may have a twenty-year latency period,259 which
necessarily would involve long delays in bringing suit. The long latency period
presents significant problems for plaintiffs-by the time cancer occurs, defend-
ants may be insolvent, critical evidence may be destroyed, proof of causation will
be complicated, and the action may be time-barred by applicable statutes of limi-
256. In some places, such testing has already begun, through "radon inspection clauses" in real
estate contracts. These clauses are already being criticized, however, "because they rely on radon
tests that can be easily manipulated by sellers or affected by environmental conditions." Galen,
supra note 3, at 10. If inspections and testing are misleading, of course the homeowners could have
additional grounds for a cause of action in fraud.
257. There is some question whether health damages may be recovered under contract theories,
such as implied warranty of habitability, but recent courts have chosen to grant such damages when
appropriate. See, e.g., Boudreau v. General Elec. Co., 2 Haw. App. 10, 625 P.2d 384 (1981).
258. See, e.g., Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 779, 787 (1985) ("[E]x post compensation may not be forthcoming in many cases of
actual injury because of the special proof problems that are themselves generated by the long lag
between act and injury .... ). Post facto recovery for radon-induced cancer is by no means impossi-
ble, however. An employer has been held liable under a Colorado statute for exposing a worker to
0.15 working level months (WLM) of radon during an eight-day period. Union Carbide Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 196 Colo. 56, 58, 581 P.2d 734, 735 (1978). The Colorado Supreme Court held
that this exposure represented "a concentration of toxic material which would be sufficient to cause
the disease." Id. at 61, 581 P.2d at 737. This "sufficient cause" standard is specific to the Colorado
occupational disease act, but if employed more generally, the rule would permit recovery for most
individuals exposed to high indoor radon levels. See also Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 544-45, 421
A.2d 674, 679 (1980) (applying this substantial factor in common-law negligence action for
malpractice).
259. See, e.g., I. TURIEL, supra note 16, at 38 ("[t]here is an average latency period of approxi-
mately twenty years between exposure to radon and the onset of cancer"); Hanley, supra note 4, at
39, col. I (radon "can possibly cause lung cancer after latency periods of 20 to 30 years").
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tations.2 60 Given these difficulties, plaintiffs have sought and likely will continue
to seek to recover in anticipation of future cancer. The ability to recover for
increased risk of contracting cancer, for fear of contracting cancer, and for costs
of future medical surveillance will now be considered.
1. Pure Increased Risk Of Cancer
Under traditional principles of tort law, the mere risk of future harm is
noncompensable. Dean Prosser has declared that "the threat of future harm,
not yet realized, is not enough."'2 61 Numerous courts confronted with such
claims have reaffirmed the traditional rule and held that simple risk of future
cancer, unaccompanied by other injuries, is insufficient to sustain an award of
damages. 262 In so holding, courts have emphasized that "[a]lowing recovery of
risk of cancer damages not only encourages anticipatory lawsuits but runs
counter to the desirable goal that cases be decided on the best quality evidence
available. '263 The courts have feared that "[t]o permit recovery for possible risk
of injury or sickness raises the spectre of potential claims arising out of tortious
conduct increasing in boundless proportion." 264 Given the widespread nature of
residential radon contamination, this fear of burgeoning litigation may be a par-
ticularly realistic one.
Notwithstanding these concerns, there is growing support for granting
damages for future risk of cancer. Commentators recently have urged this view
260. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). See generally
SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES
FROM HAZARDOUS WASTE-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES (Part 1), 40-
117 (Comm. Print 1982) (discussing "legal remedies for injuries and damage caused by exposure to
hazardous waste"). One commentator has thus noted:
First, the cancer may not show itself for up to forty years after the exposure, long after
evidence of the defendant's negligence has been lost or destroyed. Particularly troublesome
would be proving the dose of the carcinogen to which the plaintiff was exposed and proving
the identity of the defendant who actually exposed the plaintiff. Of increasing significance
is the potential insolvency or disappearance of the defendant.
Note, Damages for an Increased Risk of Developing Cancer Caused by Asbestos Exposure Are Only
Recoverable If It Is More likely Than Not That Cancer Will Develop, 51 Mo. L. REv. 847, 857-58
(1986). Statutes of limitations may still present an insurmountable obstacle for some plaintiffs. See
Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1225 (1987).
261. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 30.
262. See, eg., Plummer v. Abbott Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D.R.I. 1983) ("the possi-
bility that an individual may, because of the ingestion of certain drugs, have acquired a greater risk
of contracting cancer does not per se constitute injury for purposes of tort law"); Laswell v. Brown,
524 F. Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1981) ("lawsuit for personal injuries cannot be based upon the
possibility of some future harm"), aff'd, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210
(1983); Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("mere fact of risk without
any accompanying physical injury is insufficient to state a claim for strict products liability"); Mor-
rissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 761, 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1979) ("the possibility of
developing cancer or other injurious conditions in the future is an insufficient basis upon which to
recognize a present injury"); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 568, 461 A.2d 184,
187 (Law Div. 1983) ("enhancement of risk is not actionable"), affid, 202 N.J. 106, 493 A.2d 1314
(App. Div. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
263. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
264. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 568, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (Law Div.
1983), aft'd, 202 N.J. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1985), affid in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557,
525 A.2d 287 (1987).
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on the courts.265 In an important and recent decision involving a hazardous
waste disposal site, Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,266 the district court
seemingly adopted a new, more liberal, rule permitting recovery for pure future
risk of cancer. The court in Velsicol held that "enhanced susceptibility is an
existing condition, and not a speculative future injury. ' 267 Disclaiming the need
for plaintiffs to prove any present injury,268 Velsicol held that "enhanced risk of
liver and kidney disease and cancer suffered by the five flagship plaintiffs fits
squarely within the rule articulated in those decisions, and plaintiffs are entitled
to be compensated. '269 Other recent decisions have implied that pure increased
risk of cancer, if proved, may be sufficient to sustain a damage award. 270 Per-
suasive individual judicial opinions may also foretell an increased willingness to
permit recovery for pure increased risk of future cancer. Justice Handler of the
New Jersey Supreme Court has argued in a concurring opinion that a plaintiff
should be permitted to recover for roughly a twenty-five percent increase in can-
cer probability. 27 1 Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court likewise
contended that recovery for future cancer risk should be available. 272 Judge
Posner also has put forth a lengthy argument for the use of probabilistic mortal-
ity tables in measuring damages.
273
Thus, in future cases the pure risk of increased future cancer from residen-
tial radon exposures, contrary to the long held common-law view, may be
deemed compensable in some jurisdictions. Even assuming this development in
the law of remedies the plaintiff will still bear the burden of proving a relatively
high probability of actually developing future cancer. Initially, the homeowner
must quantify the magnitude of his risk of cancer.274 Presumably, the well-
established risk assessments for radiation would suffice as one method of demon-
strating the magnitude of risk in radon exposure cases. 275 But the mere fact that
265. See Gale & Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 COMB. L.
REv. 723 (1985); Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REv. 563
(1984).
266. 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
267. Id. at 322.
268. The court in Velsicol cited Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973),
in which "the [Oregon Supreme] Court rejected defendants' argument that 'the condition of being
susceptible to a disease is not compensible as such, at least in the absence of any present harm caused
by the possibility.'" Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. at 322. This language is dicta, however, inasmuch as the
plaintiffs in Velsicol had all suffered present injury from defendants' negligence.
269. Velsicol, 647 F.2d at 322.
270. See Note, supra note 260, at 854 & n.100 (citing cases in which courts focused on the
strength of plaintiffs' proof and implied that a showing of high enough probability of future damages
would suffice to support damages for future risk).
271. Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 422, 471 A.2d 405, 417 (1984) (Handler, J., concurring).
Judge Handler stressed that recovery should be available for future risk of cancer, even "unquanti-
fled," arguing that "[flailure to do otherwise is grossly unfair." Id. at 429, 471 A.2d at 421.
272. Jordan v. Bero, 158 W. Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974) (Neely, J., concurring).
273. See DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 206 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
274. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 122, 493 A.2d 1314, 1323 (App.
Div. 1985) ("Faced with the admitted inability of the expert witness to quantify the increased risk,
we cannot rule out the probability that such increase is so microscopically small as to be meaning-
less."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
275. A less-established procedure, extrapolation from animal tests, was accepted as adequate by
the court in Velsicol, which held that "the use of animals is a valid and scientific basis to identify
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a plaintiff may be able to quantify his increased risk of cancer will not ensure
recovery. Courts that have implied a willingness to consider damages for pure
future risk of cancer usually have required a showing of greater than fifty per-
cent probability of suffering future cancer before they will grant relief.276 To
meet this standard under the existing risk assessments, a plaintiff would have to
demonstrate cumulative exposure to 5000 WLM of radon. Such exposure levels
would be unusual, even in very high radon houses. Thus, under existing practice
the vast majority of radon plaintiffs, though suffering significant exposure, would
be foreclosed from recovery for increased future cancer risk. Unless judges be-
gin to permit relief for future cancer probabilities of less than fifty percent, 277
the pure risk of future cancer is unlikely to be available to plaintiffs exposed to
indoor radon, even at levels well in excess of the current federal standards.2
78
2. Risk of Future Cancer Plus Present Harm
Courts are much more willing to grant damages for risk of future cancer
when a plaintiff can demonstrate some existing harm from defendants' actions.
This willingness is an inevitable consequence of the general doctrine against
"claim-splitting." Under this doctrine, a party suing for present damages is pre-
cluded from bringing a second future action for subsequently realized damages
resulting from the same episode. A plaintiff suing for present damages is not
merely permitted, but required, to include claims for future risks.
2 7 9
As a result, any plaintiff who can demonstrate some present harm is thereby
able to attach a claim for damages from future increased cancer risk. In the case
potential human carcinogens and to attempt to quantify such a risk." Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. at 480;
see also Allen v. U.S., 588 F. Supp. 247, 425-28 (D. Utah 1984) (relying on the radiation dose risk
models in assigning causation for cancer).
276. See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) ("plaintiff can
recover only where he can show that the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to can-
cer"); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff must show "that he
will more likely than not experience cancer in the future"); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
781 F.2d 394, 413 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (plaintiff may recover where evidence "indicates that he has a
greater than fifty percent chance of getting cancer"), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); Stites v.
Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1523 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (requiring "reasonable
certainty that the future consequences will occur"); Martin v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 203 Cal. 291,
264 P. 246 (1928) (reasonable certainty standard); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md.
656, 666, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983) (requiring "a greater than 50% chance that a future conse-
quence will occur"); Coffman v. McFadden, 68 Wash. 2d 954, 961,416 P.2d 99, 103 (1966) (plaintiff
failed to "meet the test of reasonable probability that such conditions will occur").
277. In Velsicol the court granted damages for future risk of cancer based on the finding that
"the increased risk is substantial and at least 25% to 30%." Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. at 480. This
decision may foreshadow a more liberal test in future cases.
278. The distinction between regulatable and compensable risk was addressed in Stites v. Sunds-
trand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1525 (W.D. Mich. 1987), in which the court observed
that although a risk in excess of 186 in 100,000 "may be unacceptable in a regulatory setting, it does
not demonstrate a reasonable certainty that the affected plaintiff will get cancer." See also In re
"Agent Orange" Products Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (for compensation of
injuries at common law "a far higher probability (greater than 50%) is required"), aff'd, 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987).
279. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 410-11 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir.
1985) (party must join claim for future pulmonary disease in present case seeking damages for
asbestosis).
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of radon, however, there typically is no clear present harm (such as immediate
disease) on which to attach the future cancer claim. Creative plaintiffs have
established an avenue for surmounting this obstacle. In the first significant deci-
sion on indoor radon exposure, Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp.,280 plaintiffs al-
leged "immediate, present damage to their cellular and subcellular
structures." 281 This alleged damage took the form of alterations in subcellular
chromosomes, which is the initial precursor of what ultimately may become can-
cer. Defendants objected that this alleged harm had no external manifestation
and was inadequate to meet the requirement of present damage. 282 The district
court, however, observed that "experts are able to conclude with a reasonable
degree of medical probability" that chromosome damage has resulted 283 and
that this chromosome damage is of sufficient magnitude to constitute a present
harm permitting plaintiffs to recover for additional risk of future injury.
284
Brafford is supported by analogous cases holding that the growth of a tumor due
to medical inaction represents a present physical injury.285 Simple exposure to
radon, absent demonstrable evidence of physical damage, may not suffice to con-
stitute a present, actionable injury.
286
Permitting a subcellular change to meet the present injury requirement
opens a huge loophole in the rule. The "no-threshold" hypothesis suggests that
any exposure to a carcinogen may cause subcellular injury, and a federal district
court has observed that "the overwhelming weight of currently available scien-
tific evidence supports the view that at any exposure level, ionizing radiation
causes some degree of biological damage."'287 Consequently, this exception
could totally swallow the present injury rule in cancer cases. Brafford rejected
this "slippery slope" argument. 288 Similar subcellular damage has been recog-
nized as a physical injury in cases involving mental distress for future risk of
280. 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
281. Id. at 17.
282. Specifically, the defendant contended that "the changes are themselves nothing more than a
subcellular expression of the increased risk." Id.; see Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir.
1982) (holding that the "risk of disease and cellular damage" represents only the "possibility of some
future harm," not a present injury), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983).
283. Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17-18.
284. Citing plaintiffs' experts, the court observed that the subcellular damage might "deprive
plaintiffs of a degree of immunity" and that the " 'trigger' of a cancer change has been cocked." Id.
at 18.
285. See Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 408, 471 A.2d 405, 410 (1984) (holding that "the
spread of cancer cells into once healthy tissue... is an injury in and of itself"); Cloys v. Turbin, 608
S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (holding that even "imperceptible" growth of tumor consti-
tuted present injury).
286. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.) ("In a sense, the
injury in this case is the inhalation of asbestos fibers. It was not an actionable injury, however,
meaning it was not legally cognizable, until at least one evil effect of the inhalation became mani-
fest."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp,, 758 F.2d 936,
942 (3d Cir.) ("subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to constitute the
actual loss or damage ... required to sustain a cause of action"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
287. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 419 (D. Utah 1984).
288. Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17. The court noted that plaintiffs were exposed to high levels of
radiation and thus experts were able to conclude with a reasonable degree of medical probability that
chromosomal damage had occurred. Id. The court suggested no principled basis, however, for lim-
iting the holding to any given degree of exposure to a carcinogen.
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If Brafford's holding that subcellular damage is a present injury is sus-
tained, most plaintiffs in indoor radon cases should be able to demonstrate such
damage and therefore be able to sue for future cancer risk.290 In addition, plain-
tiffs' burden of proof in the "risk plus present damage" cases is somewhat less
than in the "pure risk" cases. Unlike the latter cases, plaintiffs may not be re-
. quired to demonstrate a greater than fifty percent probability of future cancer in
order to recover.
The actual probability of future cancer risk that plaintiffs must prove is
somewhat unclear. Even where a plaintiff has suffered a pre-existing harm,
courts have occasionally limited recovery to instances when "the prospective
consequences may, in reasonable probability be expected to flow from the past
harm. '2 91 This reasonable probability standard may require evidence "sufficient
to generate a belief that the tendered hypothesis is in all human likelihood the
fact."' 292 Alternatively expressed, plaintiffs have been allowed to recover for fu-
ture risks that "reasonably are to be expected to follow, so far as human knowl-
edge can foretell." 293 While not stated in quantitative probabilistic terms, these
standards suggest that a plaintiff still must demonstrate a fifty percent
probability of future cancer before recovering for this risk, even when accompa-
nied by actual present harm.294 Other cases have been more explicit in requiring
a plaintiff prove a fifty percent or more probability of future cancer before per-
mitting recovery.
2 95
289. See infra note 308 and accompanying text. One plaintiff's attorney has suggested that "[a]s
the development of medical science makes chromosomal damage as readily visible as broken legs,
this perception [of noninjury] should diminish." Kanner, Emerging Conceptions of Latent Personal
Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 352 (1987).
290. In addition to the generalized presumption that any level of radiation exposure may be
harmful, specialized medical techniques are available that may be able to detect chromosomal dam-
age in the cells of potential plaintiffs. See Comment, Damages in Genetic Mutation and Chromo-
somal Breakage: Tort Actions, 26 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 105, 107 n.13 (1981); Note, Increased Risk of
Disease From Hazardous Waste: A Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REv. 635, 641-42
(1985).
291. Herber v. Johns Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1986). See also Morrissy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 76 Il1. App. 3d 753, 761, 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1979) ("possible future damages in a
personal injury action are not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur"); Bennett v. Mallinc-
krodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (plaintiffs exposed to radiation must show
future cancer is "reasonably certain to occur"), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 2903 (1986); Hahn v. Mc-
Dowell, 349 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (auto accident victim must show future cancer
was "reasonably certain to ensue" before being permitted to introduce evidence for future cancer
risk); City of Waco v. Teague, 168 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ("plaintiff's recovery for
future results of the injury was restricted to such as would reasonably and probably result");
Coffman v. McFadden, 68 Wash. 2d 954, 961, 416 P.2d 99, 103 (1966) ("test of reasonable
probability that such conditions will occur as a result of the accident").
292. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (Law Div. 1983),
aff'd, 202 N.J. Super. 106 (1985 App. Div.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287
(1987).
293. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D. Mass. 1986).
294. Cf. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413 (5th Cir.) (court held that
plaintiff permitted to recover for future risk because "evidence adduced at trial indicates that he has
a greater than 50% chance of getting cancer"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
295. See Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 645 F. Supp. 764, 769 (W.D. La. 1986).
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Conversely, however, a fairly substantial number of cases have held that
plaintiffs may sometimes recover for a less than fifty percent risk of future dam-
age. Courts have permitted some recovery for lesser probabilities in cases in-
volving the occurrence of epilepsy as a result of collision,296 paralysis from
bullet wound,297 cancer from medical malpractice, 298 cancer from bums in an
accident, 299 and cancer from hazardous waste sites. 30° While these holdings are
still a minority, strong policy reasons are advanced for permitting recovery for
less than fifty percent future risks.30 1 Indeed, given the rule against claim-split-
ting, failure to compensate could totally preclude damages for a large number of
plaintiffs who may go on to suffer cancer or other serious injuries. This issue
was addressed in some detail in Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 30 2 In Feist, a child
struck on the head by a falling cash register sought to introduce evidence of
possible future meningitis resulting from a skull fracture. 30 3 The court permit-
ted this evidence, "even though meningitis was not probable, but was no more
than a possibility.
' '3° 4
The typical risk from high indoor radon levels may be in the vicinity of only
one percent; but where plaintiffs present evidence of a present injury from chro-
mosomal damage, they may be able to recover for even this slight risk of future
cancer. 305 In more restrictive jurisdictions, where a fifty percent probability of
296. See McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962) (three to twenty-five
percent chance of future epilepsy resulting from trailer accident); Potter v. Empress Theatre, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 4, 204 P.2d 120 (1949) (recovery for good possibility of future epilepsy); Schwegel v.
Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 228 A.2d 405 (1967) (five percent chance of future epilepsy resulting
from car accident).
297. See Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1983). The Fifth Circuit noted that "[w]hile the doctors did state that Martin's prognosis was
good, they also testified that there would always be some risk of future complications." Id. at 1327.
Although this risk was not quantified, the court permitted recovery for future risk, as well as mental
distress. Id.
298. See James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (even unquantifiable de-
crease in survival probability may be basis for some recovery); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 546,
421 A.2d 674, 680 (1980) ("a doctor properly may be allowed to explain the possible future effects of
an injury, and with less definiteness than is required of opinion testimony on causation" permitting
"the jury to consider the possibility of future metastasis in awarding damages"); cf James v. United
States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (post facto recovery for 35% probability of causation);
Herskovits v. Group Health Co-op., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983) (post facto recovery for
14% decrease in lung cancer survival due to misdiagnosis).
299. See Duncan v. Smith, 376 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), rev'd, 393 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.
1965).
300. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Village of Wil-
sonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 86 Il1. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981) (severe harm justifies compensation
for relatively low probability risk).
301. See, e.g., Gale & Goyer, supra note 265, at 742-43 (noting that failure to compensate for
such lesser risks may distort the deterrent and compensatory objectives of tort law).
302. 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973). See also Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 931-32 (Ky.
1984) (plaintiff may recover for future spinal meningitis even if expert witness testifies only that
plaintiff might possibly suffer this complication).
303. See Feist, 267 Or. at 403-05, 517 P.2d at 675-76.
304. Id. at 410, 517 P.2d at 679. Although this decision was only related to evidence admissibil-
ity, it carries the inevitable implication that "possible future effects" are entitled to consideration as
"a matter of substantive law." Id. at 409-10, 517 P.2d at 678.
305. In this case the recovery should be one percent of the best estimate of the future expenses,
pain, and suffering should the cancer actually occur.
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future cancer is required, prospects for recovery from indoor radon contamina-
tion appear slim.
3. Fear of Future Cancer
Courts have been somewhat more willing to grant damages for a present
fear of future cancer than for the risk of that cancer actually occurring. Deci-
sions are increasingly willing to acknowledge the significance of mental anguish
and suffering as compensable injuries, and "cancerphobia" is now a recognized
emotional injury.306 A plaintiff who genuinely suffers from a serious present
fear of incurring cancer from a defendant's activities often will be able to recover
damages for such fear.
Plaintiffs must overcome several hurdles before obtaining recovery for
cancerphobia. Many jurisdictions still require evidence of a physical injury or
impact before allowing such emotional distress damages.307 In many cancer
cases, this physical impact requirement has been relatively easy to satisfy. Some
courts have recognized subcellular chromosomal damage as sufficient to estab-
lish physical injury.30 8 In other cases, the mere "ingestion" of toxic substances
has been deemed sufficient physical impact or injury to support a mental distress
claim.309 Under this liberal standard of physical injury the intrusion of radon
daughters into the lungs of housing residents should be sufficient to maintain an
306. See, e.g., Gale & Goyer, supra note 265, at 724-36; see generally Holden, Love Canal Resi-
dents Under Stress, 208 SCIENCE 1242 (1980) (discussing psychological damage to citizens living
near a chemical dump site).
307. One review indicated that "courts have been reluctant to compensate alleged mental inju-
ries unless the plaintiff can establish the existence of a contemporaneous physical injury or impact."
Edwards & Ringleb, Exposure to Hazardous Substances and the Mental Distress Tort: Trends, Appli-
cations and a Proposed Reform, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 121 (1986). See, e.g., Johnson v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F. Supp. 764, 769 (W.D. La. 1986) ("evidence of fear of contracting
cancer is admissible when there is an actionable injury"); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540,
552-55, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-80 (1982) (discussing policy reasons underlying such a requirement).
Several jurisdictions have abolished this requirement. See, e.g., Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698
S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("Plaintiffs no longer need to allege a contemporaneous physi-
cal injury to plead a tort action for emotional distress."). In addition, independent physical injury
usually is not required for instances of intentionally inflicted emotional distress. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir.) (distinguishing the two lines of precedent),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
308. See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-27 (D. Mass. 1986). While
defendants in this case contended that such damage was insufficient to support the present injury
requirement, the court disagreed. The court held that plaintiffs' harm need only be "manifested by
objective symptomatology." Id. at 1227. A similar result was reached in another case, in which
plaintiff alleged that exposure to asbestos caused "pleural thickening" of the lungs, which defendant
characterized as an "insubstantial injury." Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir.
1986). The court held that plaintiff need only show "slight impact and injury" in order to recover
for emotional distress. Id.
309. See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (exposure
to diethylstilbestrol sufficient to support action for emotional distress damages); Eagle-Picher Indus.
v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (inhalation of asbestos fibers satisfies impact
requirement); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (ingestion of
toxic substance represents technical physical injury sufficient to maintain action for mental suffer-
ing). But see Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 570, 461 A.2d 184, 189 (Law Div.
1983) (mere ingestion insufficient to satisfy the "substantial bodily injury or sickness" required to
bring cancerphobia action), aft'd, 202 N.J. Super. 106 (1985 App. Div.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
106 N.J. Super. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). But cf. cases cited supra note 286 (holding ingestion of
carcinogenic substances is not sufficient present injury to warrant recovery for risk of future cancer).
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action for cancerphobia. In Velsicol, the court found that "[b]ecause those con-
taminants were of such a nature as to cause the reported symptoms and cellular
damage, and adverse biological change, (however slight) the Court considers
that this ingestion, inhalation or contact caused emotional distress."'310 At the
present time, there appears to be a trend toward abolishing the physical injury
requirement, 311 but where it is still a prerequisite to recovery for emotional dis-
tress, plaintiffs suing for radon exposure should be able to demonstrate such
injury or impact.
3 12
Plaintiffs seeking compensation for cancerphobia must also demonstrate
that their apprehension or fear of future cancer is "reasonable" under the cir-
cumstances. 313 Where every physician consulted "assured appellant she did not
have cancer and that there was no cause for concern," the fear of cancer may be
found unreasonable. 314 This reasonability requirement, though, is a much easier
test than the fifty percent probability rule for future risk of cancer. In Wetherill
v. University of Chicago, the court stressed that cancerphobia "merely demands a
reasonable fear, not a high degree of likelihood, that the feared contingency be
likely to occur. '315 The "reasonable fear" standard is a relatively light one, as
the court held that "fears of future injury can be reasonable even where the
likelihood of such injury is relatively low."' 316 Even relatively low statistical
probabilities of future disease do not invalidate a claim for reasonable fear of the
disease. 317 When fear of future cancer is genuine and serious, the actual
310. Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. at 320.
311. St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652-54 (Tex. 1987) (discussing general
trends in the law and abolishing Texas' prior requirement for physical injury); see also Laxton v,
Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (recovery for mental distress from
ingestion of toxic substance even without showing of accompanying physical injury).
312. In addition to the cases cited supra note 311, courts in states requiring physical injury "are
very lenient in finding allegations [of physical harm] sufficient" to satisfy the "definite and objective
physical injury" standard. Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909, 917 (W.D. Mich.
1983).
313. See, eg., Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (W.D. Mich.
1987) ("[t]o recover on their fear of cancer claim, plaintiffs must establish ... that their emotional
distress is not 'about a completely fictitious, vague, fanciful or imagined consequence, having no
reasonable basis' "); Winik v. Jewish Hosp., 31 N.Y.2d 936, 937, 293 N.E.2d 95, 95, 340 N.Y.S.2d
927, 927 (1972) (plaintiff must "demonstrate that her fear of contracting cancer was reasonable"),
314. Winik v. Jewish Hosp., 31 N.Y2d 936, 937, 293 N.E.2d 95, 95, 340 N.Y.S.2d 927, 927
(1972); see also Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 263 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (1974) (no
damages where the fear of future cancer was "remote" and "out of proportion to the culpability of
the tortfeasor").
315. 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see also Shelton v. City of College Station, 765
F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff need not establish probability of future asbestos-induced
cancer in order to recover for cancerphobia), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276 (1986); Kroger Co. v.
Beck, 176 Ind. App. 202, 375 N.E.2d 640 (1978) (recovery for mental distress does not depend on
actual occurrence of feared effects).
316. Wetherill, 565 F. Supp. at 1559.
317. See, eg., Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (Ist Cir. 1983) (ten percent chance of future
cancer); Heider v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins., 231 So. 2d 438, 442 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (two to five
percent chance of epilepsy); see also Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351,
353 (La. 1974) (future cancer improbable); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d
480, 484 (1980) (jury permitted to consider fear of future cancer from stab wound even though fear
of future cancer and heart disease unfounded). These holdings may be questioned in the future,
though, insofar as they impose potentially significant liability on defendants for medically unfounded
fears. See Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk, Uncertainty
and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 83 (1984).
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probability of contracting the cancer is not a significant barrier to recovery for
mental anguish; however, some plausible basis for the fear of future cancer is
required. 318 Authoritative medical assurance of low risk also may limit dam-
ages for fear of suffering future cancer.3 19 Plaintiffs may also be required to
prove that their mental distress was foreseeable by defendants.
320
Plaintiffs' ability to recover for mental distress from the prospect of future
cancer caused by indoor radon may be more significantly limited by the particu-
lar theory of defendants' liability in a given case. Courts have long recognized
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but proof of the requi-
site intent may be difficult in residential radon exposure actions. 32' Courts also
have been willing to grant emotional distress damages for negligent exposure to
cancer-causing agents. 322 Under strict liability, however, there is little prece-
dent for compensating mental distress such as fear of future cancer. 323 The Re-
statement of Torts on strict liability limits recovery for "physical harm. ' 324 At
least one prominent opinion has apparently followed the Restatement in denying
recovery for emotional distress in strict liability actions. 325 Other cases, how-
ever, have suggested that emotional distress damages may be recovered in at
least some strict liability actions.326 Nor is it clear whether plaintiffs may be
able to recover emotional distress damages in contract cases. 327 The ability of
318. See Harper v. Illinois Cen. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1987) (no
cancerphobia recovery "absent competent evidence of exposure to the [carcinogenic] chemicals").
The decision in Harper stressed, however, that "precision is not required" in making such exposure
estimates. Id. at 1141.
319. See Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that
damages for mental distress "would be confined to the time between the discovery of ingestion and
the negative medical diagnosis or other information that puts to rest the fear of injury").
320. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816-17 (1980)
(damages for mental anguish permitted when doctors negligently told defendant his wife had
syphilis).
321. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff
workers unable to prove that asbestos company intentionally caused harm or acted with deliberate
disregard for outcome). When radon plaintiffs can prove fraud, however, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 243-56, they may be able to make out a case for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
322. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1986) (negligent expo-
sure of worker to asbestos); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d at 517, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (negligent exposure of worker to asbestos); Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 434 (negligent contamina-
tion of household water supply with toxic chemical).
323. Velsicol is somewhat vague on this issue. The court there found defendants liable both in
strict liability and negligence and granted damages for fear of cancer, but did not specify whether
such damages were limited to the negligence claim. Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. at 321. The court unam-
biguously held that mental distress damages were available for the tort of nuisance. Id. at 321.
Nuisance is now regarded as an intentional tort, but the low standard of intent in nuisance bears
some resemblance to strict liability. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 135, at 624-25. Mental
distress damages from a nuisance also have been awarded. Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701,
613 P.2d 63, 68 (1980); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 278 (Utah 1982).
324. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
325. See Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978), aff'd, 79 I11.
2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
326. See Wetherill, 565 F. Supp. at 1561 (upholding mental anguish recovery in failure to warn
strict liability cases); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,215, 17,218
(N.D. I11. 1983) (distinguishing Woodill as involving emotional distress for damages to a third
party).
327. See Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364, 366 (La. Ct. App. 1945) (couple entitled to recover
for "disappointment" due to breach of contract for sale of home); Rogowicz v. Taylor & Gray, Inc.,
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radon-exposed plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress, absent negligence or
intentional action, is still unclear and may be expected to vary by jurisdiction.
4. Future Medical Surveillance
Residents exposed to radon and fearful of future cancer may be prompted
to seek additional and continuing diagnostic tests. These individuals may seek
compensation for the costs of future medical surveillance, allegedly made neces-
sary by defendants' tortious action. In Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, the
court recognized that a plaintiff should be able to recover "the cost of those
checkups" that are proper "to ensure early detection and treatment of a possibly
cancerous condition. '328 Other courts also have evinced a willingness to grant
recovery for demonstrably necessary future medical surveillance.329
The threshold requirements for recovery of such potential future medical
expenses are still unclear. Hagerty appears to authorize recovery for any future
treatment that is "medically advisable."' 330 This "medical advisability" test was
also employed in Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co..331 Other courts have been
much stricter.
In the lower court decision in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, for example,
the court required that the future cancer risk must, at a minimum, be quanti-
fied.332 In addition, the lower court suggested that plaintiffs must demonstrate a
"reasonable probability" of developing cancer before "imposing upon defendant
the financial burden of lifetime medical surveillance." 333 Another New Jersey
case, Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., also adopted the "reasonable probability"
test for future medical surveillance recovery.334 Yet another court has required
that a plaintiff demonstrate with reasonable certainty that future medical care
will be required under state law.335 The most recent and detailed discussion of
the standard for recovering for costs of future medical surveillance came on ap-
peal of Ayers336 before the New Jersey Supreme Court. Plaintiffs' experts in
Ayers acknowledged that they "could not quantify the extent of the enhanced
risk of cancer. ' 337 Nevertheless, the court granted damages for future medical
498 S.W.2d 352, 355-56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (person may recover for foreseeable severe mental
anguish from contract breach but may not recover for less serious, unforeseeable distress),
328. 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986).
329. See Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1986); Devlin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 561-62, 494 A.2d 495, 500 (Law Div. 1985); Askey v. Occiden-
tal Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1984).
330. 788 F.2d at 319.
331. 645 F. Supp. 764, 769 (W.D. La. 1986) (relying on Hagerty).
332. 202 N.J. Super. 106, 120, 493 A.2d 1314, 1323 (1985) arl'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J.
557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
333. Id.
334. 785 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1986). The court then confused the issue considerably by implying
that a plaintiff need only prove "a greater than average risk of contracting cancer." Id. Greater
than average is obviously a much easier test than requiring a 50% probability of future cancer.
335. Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
336. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
337. Id. at 588, 525 A.2d at 303. In Ayers, there was inadequate information regarding the
exposure levels and the interaction of the various carcinogens to which plaintiffs were exposed. Id.
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surveillance, rejected the fifty percent probability test, and required merely that
plaintiffs demonstrate that their risk was "medically significant. '338 In context,
this test appears roughly comparable to Hagerty's "medically advisable" test.
339
Under the reasonable probability test, which suggests a fifty percent risk as
a threshold for recovery, few radon plaintiffs could obtain their costs of future
medical surveillance. However, the risk from indoor radon is high enough that
future diagnostic expenses might be justified under a "medical advisability" test,
such as that employed in Hagerty or Ayers. No proof of present physical injury
is required to recover anticipated costs of future medical surveillance. 34° Where
such future medical expenses are deemed compensable, they may provide a
source of substantial recovery for plaintiffs.
341
B. Property-Related Damages
While somewhat less lucrative than personal injury damages, a homeowner
plaintiff exposed to high radon levels has a somewhat greater surety of recover-
ing some level of property damages. To some, these damages may be more im-
portant than public health recoveries. 342 Such a resident may recover the
reduced value of her home, or obtain the costs of correcting the high radon
levels, or even be able to rescind the real estate sales contract. The availability of
these remedies will depend on various factors, including the type of liability
proved. While property damages are readily available under the implied war-
ranty of habitability, negligence, and fraud causes of action, the ability to re-
cover purely economic damages under strict liability is less clear. In some real
estate cases, however, homeowners have been permitted to recover property
damages under a strict liability theory.
343
1. Reduced Property Value
The standard measure for damages to real estate is reduction in property
value.3 4 4 In the case of radon, highly elevated levels may significantly reduce
338. Id. at 606, 525 A.2d at 312-13.
339. The court in Ayers did not detail the showing required for medical significance, but relied
on the testimony of a diagnostic physican from Mount Sinai Hospital to the effect that "plaintiffs
required a program of regular medical surveillance." Id. at 599, 525 A.2d at 309. In so doing, the
court implied that such damages would be granted whenever doctors believed that future surveil-
lance was advisable. See id.
340. See Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants v. County of York, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20937 (Pa. Ct. C.P. York County May 20, 1985).
341. In Ayers, the lower court granted over $8,000,000 in damages to 339 plaintiffs, or more than
$20,000 per plaintiff. 202 NJ Super at 113, 493 A.2d at 1321.
342. See Berreby, supra note 33, at 6, col. 6 ("people aren't worried about their health-they're
worried about their property values"). "
343. See Pearl v. Allied Corp., 566 F. Supp. 400, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (property damages possible
under strict liability for installation of formaldehyde insulation); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,
269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 226, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751-52 (1969); State Stove Mfg. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d
113, 124-25 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
344. See, e.g., Crocker v. Reed, 420 So. 2d 285, 286 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). According to the
Alabama court:
The measure of damages in a suit for the breach of warranty of habitability is the difference
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the value of a home.345 When a plaintiff can prove a loss in property value
attributable to the defendant's liability, he should be able to recover these dam-
ages. An exception to this rule exists when repair or correction of the problem
would be more efficient than granting reduced property value. In many in-
stances, such repair will be the preferred remedy, regardless of relative cost.
2. Repair
When a resident is confronted with a serious public health risk from radon
contamination, his primary concern may be correction of the problem. Such
residents may very well be tempted to repair the problem themselves, and subse-
quently attempt to recover their costs. As a general rule, however, repair costs
are only recoverable when they are less than the reduction in property value.
346
Thus, the full measure of repair costs may not be recoverable in all cases.
347
Fortunately, correcting the radon problem will often be relatively inexpen-
sive,348 and repair costs often will be recoverable or reasonable, even if ulti-
mately borne by the homeowner. On occasion, however, correcting a radon
problem may involve substantial costs, rising into thousands of dollars.349 De-
fendants may seek to avoid liability for these costs, preferring a possibly lesser
cost in terms of reduced property value. Plaintiffs, though, can be expected to
seek the full costs of repair.
The general rule granting the lesser of reduced value and repair cost is not a
rigid one.350 A court's generalized concern for public health and welfare should
in the reasonable market value of the house in its condition at the time it was purchased
and the reasonable market value of the house as it would have been had the house been
constructed substantially according to the contract or warranty.
Id.; see also Westwood Dev. Co. v. Esponge, 342 S.W.2d 623, 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) ("It is well
settled that ordinarily the measure of damages for permanent and irreparable injury to real estate,
where its value has not been totally destroyed, is the difference between the actual cash or market
value immediately preceding the injury and such value immediately thereafter.").
345. See, eg., Public Apathy Said Barrier to Control of Indoor Air Contamination by Radon Gas,
17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1793, 1794 (Feb. 20, 1987) ("About ninety percent of respondents said discov-
ery of high radon levels would adversely affect the resale value of a home, and nearly two-thirds of
these believed the price of a house would decrease by 30 percent or more as the result of such a
discovery.").
346. The Department of Interior recently summarized common-law property damages as "the
lesser of diminution of market value or the cost of restoration or replacement." 51 Fed. Reg. 27674,
27690 (1986). See, eg., Regal Constr. Co. v. West Lanham Hills Citizen's Assoc., 265 Md. 302, 305,
260 A.2d 82, 84 (1970) ("if cost of restoration is disproportionate to diminution in value, then dam-
age will be measured by the difference in value"); Chevron Oil Co. v. Snellgrove, 253 Miss. 356, 359,
175 So. 2d 471, 474 (1965) (courts use "the difference in value.., to the premises" for damages,
unless "the property may be restored to its former condition at a cost less than the value determined
by the diminution of the value of the land," in which case restoration cost is the measure of dam-
ages). See also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) (plaintiff in condemnation proceeding
entitled to fair market value for his property).
347. Homeowners must be aware of the growing number of fly-by-night radon testing and repair
companies. For example, one company "'made this thing you attach to your toilet that was sup-
posed to make the radon go away with every flush.' " Berreby, supra note 33, § 3, at 6, col. 2
(quoting Stanley J. Watras, construction engineer).
348. See supra notes 99 & 105.
349. See supra notes 106-07.
350. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has "refused to make a fetish even of mar-
ket value, since that may not be the best measure of value in some cases." United States v. Cors, 337
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provide reason for correcting serious radon exposures. Where a plaintiff has a
"personal reason" for restoration, rather than reduced market value, courts are
more willing to grant restoration costs as damages. 351 Characteristics of an indi-
vidual's home should suffice to provide such a personal reason,3 5 2 especially
when health and safety are involved. Courts also are more likely to grant repair
costs for actions in tort, as opposed to contract.353 When repair costs are vastly
disproportionate to reduced market value, however, courts may hesitate to au-
thorize such repair expense as damages. 354 In most instances, however, repair
costs should be available as a remedy for successful plaintiffs.
3. Rescission
Some homeowners who have been exposed to high radon levels may prefer
moving to remaining in even a repaired home. These plaintiffs may seek to re-
scind the contract under which they purchased the radon-contaminated home.
Where a successful case can be made for fraud, a plaintiff presumptively will be
able to elect to rescind the contract and obtain some restitution for past pay-
ments on the house.35" Rescission also may be available for a violation of the
implied warranty of habitability.
3 5 6
In addition to fraud and implied warranty of habitability, discussed above,
rescission may be available under the doctrine of mutual mistake. When the
parties to a transaction are mistaken regarding a basic assumption of the con-
tract, either may rescind upon discovery of the mistake.3 57 In the present con-
U.S. 325, 332 (1949). On another occasion, the Court stressed that market value "is not an absolute
standard nor an exclusive method of valuation." United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365
U.S. 624, 633 (1961).
351. See, eg., United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.
1965); Maloof v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Md. 1965); Levi v. Schwarz, 201 Md. 575,
581, 95 A.2d 322, 327 (1953); In re County of Suffolk, 47 N.Y.2d 507, 511, 392 N.E.2d 1236, 1238,
419 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1979).
352. See Samson Constr. Co. v. Brusowankin, 218 Md. 458, 469, 147 A.2d 430, 437 (1958)
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 929, to the effect that if "a building such as a homestead is
used for a purpose personal to the owner," then "damages ordinarily include an amount for repairs,
even though this might be greater than the entire value of the building").
353. See Board of Educ. v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975) ("cost of
restoration or repair, where feasible, always has been the measure of damages in tort cases for dam-
age to structures on realty").
354. See Farny v. Bestfield Builders, Inc., 391 A.2d 212, 214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (permitting
consideration of restoration costs but rejecting this remedy when it is "unreasonable and unduly
excessive for the amount of damage suffered").
355. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 9.2 (1972); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 135, § 105 at 729
("when a contract, or other bargaining transaction, such as a conveyance of an interest in land, is
induced by a material misrepresentation by one of the parties to the transaction, the other party who
is adversely affected may rescind").
356. See, eg., Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co. 27 111. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979) (permit-
ting rescission for violation of implied warranty of habitability even where house was not danger-
ously unsafe); Finke v. Woodard, 122 Ill. App. 3d 911, 462 N.E.2d 13 (1984) (permitting rescission
for violation of implied warranty of habitability where, among other problems, there was future risk
of wall falling out of structure); Snowden v. Gaynor, 710 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (permit-
ting rescission for violation of implied warranty of habitability for cracks in home).
357. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 502 (1932). According to the Restatement:
[W]here the parties on entering into a transaction that affects their contractual relations are
both under a mistake regarding a fact assumed by them as the basis on which they entered
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troversy, when indoor radon levels are unknown, the parties were mistaken
regarding the fundamental safety of the residence. Courts have granted rescis-
sion of real estate contracts for mistakes of lesser magnitude. For example, in
Miller v. Varilek 358 the purchase of a house with an inoperable septic system
that rendered the property uninhabitable provided grounds for rescission under
the doctrine of mutual mistake. Rescission for mistake has also been granted for
inadequacy of water pressure359 and termite infestation. 360 Placed in the con-
text of these decisions, the unsafe nature of dwellings with high radon concentra-
tions should be sufficient to qualify as a mutual mistake over a basic assumption.
The right of rescission due to mutual mistake is not absolute. Where a
homeowner has assumed the risk of mistake, such as through an effective dis-
claimer of liability, rescission will be denied.3 61 Mere negligence in inspection
by the buyer, however, should not bar rescission. 362 Rescission for mutual mis-
take may also be unavailable where the defect can be easily and inexpensively
corrected. 363 Notwithstanding these defenses, mutual mistake holds some prom-
ise as a last resort for plaintiffs suing for radon contamination. To succeed in
mistake, plaintiff need not show defendant's knowledge of the hazard, negli-
gence, or even a "defect" under the standards of strict liability. By simply prov-
ing the existence of high levels of indoor radon, plaintiff may be deemed to show
a mutual mistake over a vital fact in the transaction, and thereby avoid the con-
tract. Under some circumstances, however, a plaintiff may elect either rescission
and damages as her remedy, or an equitable action for rescission may preclude
recovery of other contract damages.
364
into the transaction, it is voidable by either party if enforcement of it would be materially
more onerous to him than it would have been had the fact been as the parties believed it to
be ....
Id. Rescission also may be available for unilateral mistake, when only the buyer is unaware of the
radon problem. See Cummings v. Dusenbury, 129 Ill. App. 3d 338, 342-45, 472 N.E.2d 575, 578-79
(1984) (permitting rescission for unilateral mistake in real estate); Bucciero v. Drinkwater, 13 Mass.
App. 551, 434 N.E.2d 1315 (1982). In this case, where the seller is aware of a radon problem, he or
she should be under a duty to inform the buyer, and failure to do so would represent fraud as well as
unilateral mistake.
358. 117 Mich. App. 165, 171, 323 N.W.2d 637, 639 (1982).
359. Blythe v. Coney, 228 Ark. 824, 827, 310 S.W.2d 485, 487 (1958).
360. Davey v. Brownson, 3 Wash. App. 820, 825-26, 478 P.2d 258, 260 (1970).
361. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1979) (providing that a "party bears
the risk of mistake" when it is allocated to him "by agreement of the parties," or when "he is aware,
at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to
which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient."); see, e.g., Lenawee County
Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 28-29, 331 N.W.2d 203, 209 (1983).
362. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 (1979) (negligence does not bar rescis-
sion for mutual mistake).
363. See, eg., Grant v. Morris, 2 Wash. App. 134, 498 P.2d 336 (1972) (where it would cost
$5000 to remedy construction defects in a $525,000 apartment building).
364. See, eg., Owens v. Smith, 154 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (suit in equity for
rescission precludes recovery of damages for same fraud); Sickels v. Aetna Sec. Co., 220 Ind. 347, 41
N.E.2d 947 (1942) (requiring election of damages between rescission and fraud); Mills v. Keasler,
395 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1965); Turner v. Carey, 227 S.C. 298, 87 S.E.2d 871 (1955). Analogously, a
suit for damages may preclude an action for rescission. See L'Evesque v. Rognrud, 254 Minn. 55, 93
N.W.2d 672 (1958) (requiring election of remedies). Thus, a plaintiff could not both rescind the
contract and receive reduced property value damages. In several more recent cases, however, courts
have permitted plaintiffs to seek both rescission and damages when the two remedies would not
involve duplicative recoveries. See Walraven v. Martin, 123 Mich. App. 342, 333 N.W.2d 569
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CONCLUSION
A substantial number of American houses are presently exposing their oc-
cupants to a serious risk of cancer, far exceeding that from hazardous waste
dumps or other general environmental problems. As citizens become increas-
ingly aware of the radon hazards present within their own homes, they are cer-
tain to react. Such individuals no doubt will seek redress at law-including
correction of the hazardous situation and the recovery of damages for exposure
to high radon levels.
A homeowner's ability to establish liability in circumstances of excessive
indoor radon contamination is currently unclear. The precise nature of the the-
ories and types of recovery available is not defined any better. Notwithstanding
this uncertainty, such individuals should succeed in most instances of high ra-
don exposure. The magnitude of the radon risk is massive, easily dwarfing other
better known environmental hazards. The continued presence of this risk is in-
excusable, given the ease of correcting the vast majority of homes with excessive
radon. Consequently, it is incumbent upon builders and other real estate profes-
sionals to correct the problem and assume responsibility for their past mistakes.
Such an expansion of liability is sure to be feared and resisted by the build-
ing industry. Anticipation of another asbestos situation, with widespread bank-
ruptcy and the virtual destruction of a major industry, is a proper concern for
policymakers and even courts. 365 Yet important differences between the asbes-
tos and radon situations suggest a more promising result of radon litigation.
While the overall national harm from radon may equal or even surpass that of
asbestos, the risk to any given individual is likely to be less. Accordingly, mas-
sive personal injury damage awards should be much less common for radon
plaintiffs. The remedy for radon contamination will often be limited to the costs
of home repair, future medical surveillance, and possibly some small percentage
of future cancer costs. If so, the tort system will be operating at its best, serving
to correct a major public health problem at reasonable cost to defendants. For
those fewer individuals exposed to extraordinarily high levels, and extraordina-
rily high risks of cancer, more substantial compensation should be forthcoming.
(1983) (permitting plaintiff to pursue both rescission and consequential damages, but recovery can-
not be had for both); Kinkade v. Markus, 38 Or. App. 131, 589 P.2d 1142 (1979) (permitting rescis-
sion and damages for improvements to property); Isaacs v. Bokor, 566 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1978).
Under these cases, a plaintiff should be able to obtain rescission and damages for interim improve-
ments or health damages.
365. Approximately 20,000 asbestos cases are now pending, with cumulative claims in excess of
$30 billion. Johns-Manville, of course, has declared bankruptcy as a result of the threat of this
litigation. See Rosenberg, Book Review, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1693 1698-1701 (1986) (reviewing P.
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUcT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)).
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